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I. INTRODUCTION 
The modern First Amendment law of commercial speech (that is, 
commercial advertising) displays an internal contradiction.  Advertising 
regulation falls into two categories: (1) regulation on the ground that the 
speech is false or misleading and (2) everything else.  When government 
seeks to regulate commercial advertising on the ground that it is false or 
misleading, the law gives it broad freedom of action and the power to 
regulate in ways—and for reasons—that would never pass muster in the 
political arena.1  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Wayne State University.  I’m grateful to Jessica Litman; my 
colleagues on the ACLU’s Committee on Corporate Personhood and Constitutional 
Protections, including Roslyn Litman, Frank Askin, Caitlin Borgmann, David Cruz, and Ellen 
Feingold; the organizers of and participants in the American Antitrust Institute’s 2012 
Conference on Harmonizing Civil Liberties and Antitrust Policy, including Bert Foer, the 
Hon. Douglas Ginsburg, and Christopher Sagers; and my colleagues Bob Ackerman, Laura 
Bartell, Lance Gable, Chris Lund, David Moss, and Steven Winter.  Neither the ACLU nor 
the AAI, nor any of the people listed here, bear any responsibility for my errors or 
idiosyncratic views. 
1.  See infra Part III. 
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moving ever more strongly to the posture that governments may not 
restrict advertising on any ground other than that it is false or 
misleading; when it seeks to do so, it is subject to the same restrictions 
that apply when it seeks to regulate political speech.2  But the Court has 
never adequately justified this distinction, and it does not look easily 
justifiable.3  
In this Article I suggest that we can better understand the divide in 
modern commercial speech law by looking to a larger issue: the law’s 
treatment of speech by for-profit corporations.  In general, the Court 
has told us, corporate speech is entitled to the same protection as that 
uttered by individuals.4  The Supreme Court cases initially articulating 
that rule are contemporaneous with, and share reasoning in common 
with, the ones initially disapproving regulation of commercial speech.5  
Both sets of cases stress the informational value of the speech in 
question, so that for the government to restrict the speech would 
deprive us all of the information and views it conveys.6  Both express 
concern about the power of government through selective regulation to 
skew the marketplace of ideas.7 
At the same time, the First Amendment law of corporate speech 
betrays a countertheme: the concern, manifested in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce,8 that unrestrained corporate speech can skew 
and distort the marketplace of ideas.  That theme runs parallel to the 
commercial-speech concern that misleading advertising can lead 
consumers astray in ways that the marketplace of ideas will not be able 
to counteract.  In both contexts, the law approves government actions 
that some might consider paternalistic in order to protect an adequately 
functioning speech marketplace.  
In the context of corporate speech, the Austin concern for 
“distortion” or skew9 ended up gaining little traction, and for good 
reason.10  Taken to its logical extreme, it might support an argument that 
corporate speech should have no First Amendment protection 
whatsoever.  But it’s hard to make that argument work.  In thinking 
 
2.  See infra Part II. 
3.  See infra Part III. 
4.  See infra Part IV.B. 
5.  See infra Part IV.B. 
6.  See infra Parts II, IV.B. 
7.  See infra Parts II, IV.B. 
8.  494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
9.    Id. 
10.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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about the informational value of for-profit corporations’ speech, there’s 
no good way of drawing the line between those corporate media entities 
whose speech we value for the benefits it brings the rest of us and those 
corporate entities whose speech we might seek to restrain as distorting 
the marketplace of ideas.  And a legislative rule seeking to restrict 
corporate speech so as to minimize distortion, outside of the specialized 
context of candidate elections, would have to be hugely sweeping if it 
were to be meaningful at all.  The resulting political system would not be 
one we would recognize. 
In the commercial-speech context, by contrast, the obstacles to 
regulation are not so unmanageable; we can construct a limited domain 
that acknowledges the truth that the marketplace of ideas does not 
always function as advertised.  It is not plain, though, that that domain 
should be limited to the category of false or misleading speech.  On the 
contrary, there is a good argument that when it comes to regulation of 
true, nonmisleading commercial speech as well the courts should apply a 
standard of scrutiny more forgiving than that applied to regulation of 
speech generally. 
In Parts II and III, I will examine the contradiction between the 
ordinary First Amendment law of (nonmisleading) commercial 
advertising and the law relating to misleading or confusing advertising 
and trademarks.  In Part IV, I will explore a contradiction within the law 
of political speech by corporations.  In Part V, I will argue that the rifts 
within both the law of commercial speech and that of corporate speech 
are parallel, deeply rooted, and reflect a fundamental dichotomy within 
American jurisprudence.  In Part VI, I will return to the law of 
corporate speech, and in Part VII, I will build on those insights to 
suggest that the Supreme Court has taken the law of commercial speech 
in the wrong direction.  
II. THE ROAD TO SORRELL 
U.S. constitutional law before 1975 saw commercial advertising as 
falling wholly outside the First Amendment.  Advertising was the 
“promot[ion] or [pursuit of] a gainful occupation” and not speech at 
all.11  When the Court found itself divided over a state’s ban on door-to-
door magazine selling, the Justices agreed that “of course” a seller of 
“gadgets or brushes” or “pots” could raise no First Amendment claim—
 
11.  Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).  The Court in Chrestensen upheld 
an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of advertising handbills in the streets.  Id. at 55. 
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he was engaging in commercial activity, not speech.12  The Justices 
followed that understanding in the Capital Broadcasting case, summarily 
affirming a ruling upholding Congress’ prohibition of cigarette 
advertising in broadcast media.13  That view of commercial advertising 
contributed as well to the Court’s ruling in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, upholding an ordinance 
forbidding newspapers from organizing employment ads into sex-
segregated categories.14   
Things began to change, though, in the 1975 case of Bigelow v. 
Virginia.15  This case, decided a couple of years after Roe v. Wade,16 
concerned a state statute making it illegal to “encourage or prompt the 
procuring of abortion.”17  The State of Virginia had criminally charged 
an alternative weekly publisher for running an ad beginning 
“UNWANTED PREGNANCY LET US HELP YOU—Abortions are 
now legal in New York” and offering, for a fee, to place women with 
New York hospitals and clinics performing abortions.18  The Court 
treated the speech as protected; while it was commercial advertising 
related to the marketplace of products and services, the Court found 
that its contribution to the marketplace of ideas outweighed Virginia’s 
interest in suppressing information about a constitutionally protected 
service legally offered in another state.19 
The big doctrinal shift came the following year: in Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court 
considered a statute banning pharmacists from advertising their prices 
for prescription drugs.20  Ruling law indicated that Virginia’s ban should 
be treated as a regulation of commercial transactions, with no further 
significance—but the Court disagreed.21  This was a First Amendment 
case, Justice Blackmun explained, in part because drug price 
information was important to consumers and vital to the well-being of 
the poor, sick, and aged, and in part because “the free flow of 
 
12.  Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641 (1951); id. at 650 n.* (Black, J., dissenting). 
13.  Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 583–84 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d mem., 
Capital Broad. Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).  
14.  413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973). 
15.  421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
16.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
17.  Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812–13 (quoting  VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)). 
18.  Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (Va. 1972), rev’d, 421 U.S. 809 
(1975). 
19.  Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818–29. 
20.  425 U.S. 748, 749–50 (1976) (quoting VA. CODE. ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974)). 
21.  Id. at 758–70. 
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commercial information is indispensable” if resources are to be properly 
allocated in our economy.22  Economic theory, after all, predicts that 
market allocation will be inefficient if not driven by informed consumer 
decisions.23 
It’s worth noting how odd those arguments were from a First 
Amendment perspective.  That a ban on drug price advertising will 
cause the elderly to pay too much for drugs is an important policy 
argument, but the desirability of inexpensive drugs for the elderly seems 
like a matter for legislators to weigh; it’s not a First Amendment goal 
trumping the collective decision-making process.24  Whatever values are 
understood to underlie speech’s privileged constitutional status—
whether they relate to self-government, the communicative participation 
necessary for democratic legitimacy, the search for truth, or individual 
self-realization—those values don’t include the availability of cheap 
medications or consumer products.25  And it’s hard to argue that 
widespread dissemination of price information is constitutionally 
mandated by virtue of its value in promoting efficient market allocation 
given that the Constitution doesn’t mandate that any particular sector of 
the economy utilize market allocation at all, efficient or otherwise.26  It 
leaves these issues as policy questions for the policy process.27 
The Virginia Board opinion, though, also phrased its concerns in a 
way more in line with traditional First Amendment thinking.  Justice 
Blackmun stressed the difficulty of drawing lines adequately 
distinguishing advertising from other speech, and he suggested that 
commercial advertising might contain information relevant to political 
debate (if only the question of how the state should regulate the activity 
being advertised).28  Government, in blocking that information, was 
keeping information from the citizenry using an explicitly content-based 
mechanism.29  That was censorship of information in the public sphere—
no matter that it was merely information about product pricing—and it 
 
22.  Id. at 762–65. 
23.  Id. at 765. 
24.  See Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due 
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1979). 
25.  Id. at 7–25. 
26.  See id. at 32.  
27.  See id. at 34.  But see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 480 
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that advertising is “an essential ingredient of the 
[economic] competition that our public law promotes” is part of its First Amendment value). 
28.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764–65. 
29.  Id. at 770–71. 
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therefore implicated the First Amendment.30  “[P]eople will perceive 
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that 
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication 
rather than to close them.”31 
The Court in Virginia Board emphasized that government could still 
ban advertising that contained false statements, or statements that were 
not provably false but were nonetheless deceptive or misleading.32  
Returning to the metaphor of the free flow of commercial information, 
Justice Blackmun said the state had the right to ensure that the 
“stream . . . flow[s] cleanly.”33  Commercial advertising, he suggested, 
might be more easily verifiable by its distributor than other speech and 
was less likely to be chilled.34  Accordingly, it was “less necessary to 
tolerate inaccurate statements” in this arena.35  At the same time, he 
stressed, the state could not achieve its commercial goals through the 
mechanism of keeping people in ignorance.36  In particular, it could not 
“completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful 
information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s 
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.”37 
That condemnation of regulators “suppress[ing] . . . truthful 
information”38 seemed clear-cut, but in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission39 five years later, the Court took an 
ambiguous step back.  The case involved a New York rule banning 
advertising by electric utilities promoting the use of electricity on the 
theory that New Yorkers would be better off if they weren’t motivated 
to consume quite so much electricity.40  The Court didn’t seem to have a 
problem with the state’s larger approach.  It explained that in contrast to 
the usual First Amendment rule—that government can regulate speech 
on content-based grounds only in exceptional cases where strictly 
necessary to vindicate a “compelling” state interest—content-based 
 
30.  Id. at 770. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. at 770–73. 
33.  Id. at 771–72. 
34.  Id. at 772 n.24. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 770. 
37.  Id. at 773.  The Court distinguished Capital Broadcasting as involving “the special 
problems of the electronic broadcast media.”  Id.  
38.  Id. at 772 n.24. 
39.  447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
40.  Id. at 558–60 (citing STATE OF N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, STATEMENT OF POLICY 
ON ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1977)). 
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regulation of advertising was fine so long as it satisfied a less demanding 
test that the rule directly advanced some “substantial” interest and was 
no broader than it needed to be.41 
The Court offered no explanation for why it selected that standard 
of scrutiny, and it offered no case law support.42  It declined to rely on 
either Capital Broadcasting or Pittsburgh Press.43  To the contrary, it 
noted that “in recent years, this Court has not approved a blanket ban 
on commercial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some 
way, either because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.”44  
The Court’s willingness to adopt a less demanding test seems to have 
been driven by its general sense that commercial speech was simply “of 
less constitutional moment than other forms of speech.”45 
In the end, the Court struck down the New York statute: it found 
that the law banned the advertising of energy-efficient products and 
services that would actually promote energy savings and, consequently, 
was too broad.46  Its willingness to scrutinize the law closely,47 and a 
footnote indicating that courts should “review with special care 
regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue 
a nonspeech-related policy,”48 suggested some discomfort with the 
state’s mode of regulation.  Nonetheless, the Court’s announced test, 
and the structure of its opinion, indicated that it was willing to approve 
state attempts to influence consumers’ behavior by limiting the 
advertising they received.49 
 
41.  Id. at 564. 
42.  It did cite its decision three years earlier in Carey v. Population Services 
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), which it characterized, expansively, as holding open the 
possibility that the state might impose carefully drawn restrictions on contraceptive 
advertising for reasons such as minimizing offensiveness and protecting children.  See Cent. 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565–66.  
43.  The Court did not mention Capital Broadcasting at all, and it distinguished 
Pittsburgh Press as involving “speech related to illegal activity.”  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
564.  In so doing, it followed Virginia Board, which characterized Pittsburgh Press as a case 
where “the transactions proposed in the forbidden advertisements are themselves illegal.”  
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772.  That was a stretch, though.  See infra notes 456–
62 and accompanying text. 
44.  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9; see also supra note 43. 
45.  Id. at 562 n.5. 
46.  Id. at 569–71. 
47.  See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court Term, 1979—Foreword: Freedom of 
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34–36 (1980). 
48.  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9. 
49.  Justices Blackmun’s separate opinion noted this view and expressly declined to 
endorse it.  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573–74 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[E]nergy 
conservation is a goal of paramount national and local importance.  I disagree with the Court, 
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A year later, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, the plurality 
emphasized the “subordinate position” and “lesser protection” of 
commercial speech.50  It stated that it was within a city’s power to ban all 
commercial advertising via billboard, notwithstanding the Justices’ 
doubts whether a similar ban would be constitutional for 
noncommercial messages,51 and it held that government could draw 
content-based lines between different advertising messages given mere 
rational basis in a way that would be impermissible for noncommercial 
speech.52 
The Court’s willingness to approve commercial speech regulation 
reached a high point in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism 
Co.53  The legislature in that case had restricted the advertising of casino 
gambling to Puerto Rico residents by virtue of its view that advertising 
would cause residents to gamble more and  
[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would 
produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare 
of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and 
cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of 
prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration 
of organized crime.54 
The Court upheld the law.55 
But later on, the ground shifted again.  In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, the Court struck down a Rhode Island law banning the 
price advertising of alcoholic beverages.56  Although the majority could 
not unite behind a single holding, four of the Justices took a firm stand 
against the constitutionality of any law restricting the dissemination of 
                                                                                                                                           
however, when it says that suppression of speech may be a permissible means to achieve that 
goal.”). 
50.  453 U.S. 490, 506–07 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63). 
51.  See id. at 503–17. 
52.  See id. 
53.  478 U.S. 328 (1986).  
54.  Id. at 330, 341 (quoting Brief for Appellees’ at 37, Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (No. 84-
1903)). 
55.  Id. at 348; see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding 
a ban on direct-mail solicitation of personal injury victims for thirty days following an 
accident on the grounds that such solicitations invade victims’ privacy and tranquility and 
reflect poorly on the profession); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421, 436 
(1993) (upholding a federal law allowing the advertisement of state-run lotteries only in 
publications published in, or broadcasters licensed to, the relevant state). 
56.  517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996). 
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advertising messages unless the messages were false, misleading, or 
presented the risk of coercion or undue influence.57  Three of the four 
urged that strict scrutiny was appropriate because such government 
rules are paternalistic: “The First Amendment directs us to be especially 
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the 
government perceives to be their own good.”58  One of the four would 
have dispensed with strict scrutiny, holding such rules unconstitutional 
per se.59  Four other Justices saw no need to go so far but indicated that 
government cannot ban advertising when it can achieve its goals more 
directly by regulating purchases of the advertised product.60 
The Court vacillated in the years that followed.  In Greater New 
Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, considering a federal ban 
on broadcast casino-gambling advertising that could be received in 
states without casinos, seven or eight Justices seemed to view as 
legitimate the states’ interests in ameliorating the costs of casino 
gambling by prohibiting advertising, and thus limiting demand.61  But a 
five-Justice majority rejected that approach in Thompson v. Western 
States Medical Center.62  There, the Court considered federal law 
governing compounding pharmacies (that is, pharmacies that prepare 
customized medications not available from pharmaceutical companies, 
for example, by preparing a medication in a nonstandard dosage or in 
liquid rather than pill form).63  The law exempted compounding 
pharmacies from Food and Drug Administration (FDA) “new drug” 
regulation (which would have required them to prove the safety and 
efficacy of their formulations through clinical trials) but imposed 
 
57.  See id. at 501–04 (plurality opinion); id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in 
the judgment). 
58.  Id. at 503 (plurality opinion). 
59.  Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
60.  Id. at 530–31 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  This approach, also 
visible in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995), has been described as 
“replicat[ing] strict scrutiny without saying so.”  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, 
Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 S. CT. REV. 123, 145. 
 The ninth Justice was Justice Scalia.  His opinion suggested that First Amendment 
protection of commercial speech was questionable given the national consensus in favor of 
advertising regulation at the times the First and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted.  44 
Liquormart, 514 U.S. at 517–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
61.  527 U.S. 173, 189 (1999).  The interest, put another way, was one in avoiding 
situations where citizens of noncasino states would “hear [the speech] and make rash or costly 
decisions.”  Id. at 194.  The Court struck down the law as inadequately tailored to the goals it 
sought to advance.  Id. at 195–96. 
62.  535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
63.  Id. at 360–61. 
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restrictions including a ban on promoting or advertising the 
compounding of particular drugs.64 
The Court held the statute unconstitutional.65  Four dissenting 
Justices urged that the absence of FDA-required testing made 
compounding pharmacy products more risky than other drugs,66 and 
they saw the statute as well tailored to the goal of avoiding advertising-
driven demand for compounding-pharmacy products on the part of 
patients whose needs could be otherwise served.67  There was no need 
for demanding scrutiny, they urged.68  Advertising restrictions “do not 
often repress individual self-expression; they rarely interfere with the 
functioning of democratic political processes; and they often reflect a 
democratically determined governmental decision to regulate a 
commercial venture in order to protect, for example, the consumer, the 
public health, individual safety, or the environment.”69  For the majority, 
though, the dissenters’ argument was flawed at the root: it was no more 
than the “fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful 
information.”70 
Finally, five years ago, the Court decided Sorrell v. IMS Health, 
Inc.71  Sorrell involved a Vermont restriction on the use, for marketing 
purposes and without a doctor’s permission, of pharmacy-collected lists 
of the drugs each doctor prescribed.72  Drug companies were using that 
information to tailor their one-on-one marketing pitches to doctors, and 
the Vermont legislature felt that those tailored pitches were sufficiently 
effective as to cause doctors to overprescribe expensive brand-name 
drugs and underprescribe generics.73  Without that detailed information, 
when it came time for pharmaceutical representatives to make their 
sales pitches and offer the doctors free drug samples (over $11 billion 
worth industry-wide every year74), along with “gifts, free meals, and 
 
64.  Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 
111 Stat. 2296, 2328–30 (initially (but no longer) codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353a (Supp. 1997)). 
65.  Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377. 
66.  See id. at 382–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
67.  Id. at 379. 
68.  Id. at 387–89. 
69.  Id. at 388. 
70.  Id. at 374 (majority opinion). 
71.  131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
72.  Id. at 2659. 
73.  Id. at 2661. 
74.  IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d, 550 F.3d 
42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 936 (2009). 
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other inducements,”75 the legislature concluded, doctors would find the 
industry’s pitches for expensive proprietary drugs less appealing.76 
The Supreme Court approached the case as a restriction on 
commercial speech and, by a 6–3 majority, struck down the law.77  The 
majority mentioned Central Hudson only once.78  The fact that the law 
singled out for regulation the use of certain information in connection 
with for-profit advertising, while leaving untouched its use in connection 
with other speech, the Court said, mandated strict scrutiny.79  The fact 
that the restriction intended to “suppress” the advertisers’ message that 
doctors should prescribe their brand-name products made it 
impermissible without more.80  Narrow tailoring was irrelevant because 
the state’s concerns about drug-company marketing were “incompatible 
with the First Amendment.”81 
It’s fair to say, I think, that Central Hudson is no longer good law.  
The Sorrell Court purported to follow Central Hudson, but it turned it 
on its head: it described that case as standing for the proposition that 
government, in regulating advertising, may not “seek to suppress a 
disfavored message.”82  According to the Sorrell Court, a law that 
regulates advertising—although not other speech—should by virtue of 
that fact alone be deemed both content- and speaker-based and, 
therefore, subject to heightened scrutiny.83  All the more, when 
government restricts advertising because it disfavors a particular 
commercial message (as it did in Central Hudson), it violates the general 
rule forbidding government to regulate speech “because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys”—a rule for which 
“[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”84  Thus, after Sorrell, there is no 
room left in the law for Central Hudson’s view that—in principle—the 
 
75.  Id. at 168. 
76.  See id. at 171–73. 
77.  The dissenters (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan) disagreed that this was a 
commercial speech matter; they urged that the state was only restricting the use of 
information gathered pursuant to regulatory mandate and not implicating the First 
Amendment at all.  To the extent that there was a commercial speech restriction here, they 
continued, it satisfied the Central Hudson test.  See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
78.  Id. at 2668 (majority opinion). 
79.  Id. at 2663–64. 
80.  See id. at 2667–72. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 2668. 
83.  See id. at 2663–64, 2667. 
84.  Id. at 2664 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
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state has the power to limit an industry’s advertising on the theory that 
more extensive advertising would lead to greater consumption of a 
disfavored product.85 
Now, state regulation disfavoring a particular advertising message 
does not necessarily constitute “paternalism” as that term is usually 
understood.86  When New York in Central Hudson banned utilities from 
running ads promoting electricity use, it didn’t do so because it believed 
that people would respond to the ads by doing something personally 
destructive or against their own interests; rather, it believed that 
increased electricity consumption might be in individuals’ own interests 
but not in those of society as a whole.87  In Virginia Board, similarly, the 
concern was not that price information would lead consumers to make 
ill-advised choices but that the pressures of price competition would 
lead pharmacists to act as merchants rather than professionals.88 
Both of these were instances of classic regulation, seeking to achieve 
a public good by lessening the incidence of self-interested private action.  
When the Court has struck down commercial speech regulation, indeed, 
it has almost always been because the government sought by the speech 
restriction to discourage persons from doing things that were in fact in 
their individual self-interest (though not, it was thought, in the interest 
of society as a whole).  Whatever that is, it isn’t paternalism.89 
Nevertheless, cases like Bigelow, Virginia Board, and 44 Liquormart 
demonstrate the appeal of the argument that government regulation of 
commercial speech constitutes impermissible censorship burdening the 
thinking process of the public.  The idea that government should not be 
 
85.  See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 162–64 (2d Cir. 2012).  See generally 
Hunter B. Thomson, Note, Whither Central Hudson? Commercial Speech in the Wake of 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 171 (2013).  But see, e.g., Hart v. 
Electronic Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769–70 (D.N.J. 2011) (“Sorrell did not explicitly 
overrule Central Hudson . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
86.  Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and 
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1237 (1988). 
87.  See id. at 1241. 
88.  See id. at 1238; see also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First 
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 484–89 (1985) (discussing Central Hudson).  Indeed, 
when Rhode Island in 44 Liquormart banned liquor price advertising, its primary concern was 
not that people would learn about low liquor prices and be inspired to drink more than was 
good for them.  It was that price advertising would lead liquor stores to compete on price 
grounds and sell their product more cheaply—again, something in the stores’ own interests 
but something the legislature deemed to be contrary to those of society as a whole.  See 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7–9 (1st Cir. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
89.  See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 43–44, 50–53 (2000).  On paternalism, see generally Bill New, Paternalism and Public 
Policy, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 63 (1999). 
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seeking to manipulate individual action by limiting the information 
available to people—whether paternalistically or not—strikes a deep 
First Amendment chord.  Justice Stevens once put it this way: 
Any “interest” in restricting the flow of accurate information 
because of the perceived danger of that knowledge is anathema 
to the First Amendment; more speech and a better informed 
citizenry are among the central goals of the Free Speech Clause.  
Accordingly, the Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state 
interests that seek to keep people in the dark for what the 
government believes to be their own good.90 
First Amendment lawyers’ alarm bells typically go off the most 
loudly whenever the fact that somebody might be informed or 
convinced by speech is offered as a reason for regulating it.91  And that, 
after all, was the fact pattern of many of the commercial speech cases, 
including Central Hudson.  A First Amendment philosophy premised on 
the belief that government cannot be trusted to decide what arguments 
citizens should be exposed to, and what they should be allowed to know, 
will reject this sort of commercial speech regulation—without regard to 
whether the advertising’s subject matter is of core First Amendment 
concern and without regard to the identity of the speakers.92 
III. THE CHALLENGE OF DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 
At the same time the Court was articulating this libertarian 
understanding of commercial speech law, though, it maintained its 
 
90.  Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
91.  See, e.g., Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688–89 
(1959) (“New York has . . . prevent[ed] the exhibition of a motion picture because that 
picture advocates an idea . . . .  Yet the First Amendment’s basic guarantee is of freedom to 
advocate ideas. . . . [I]t protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is 
unconvincing.”); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 334 (1991) (“The government may not suppress speech on the ground 
that it is too persuasive.”). 
92.  Kathleen Sullivan points out that this approach, identifying as the most pernicious 
threats to free speech government “paternalistic protection of listeners” and government 
restrictions on private actors’ use of their own resources for speech, reflects a particular 
understanding of the First Amendment.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court Term, 
2009—Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155–63 (2010).  She 
contrasts that approach, which she calls free-speech-as-liberty, with the competing one she 
calls free-speech-as-equality.  Id. at 163–66.  The latter—at least as well-rooted in the case 
law—instead stresses government’s obligation to protect dissenters and to open public 
resources for speech by rich and poor alike.  See id. at 146–55; see also Victoria Baranetsky, 
Note, The Economic-Liberty Approach of the First Amendment: A Story of American 
Booksellers v. Hudnut, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 171, 176–79 (2012).  That dichotomy 
can be seen to parallel the one introduced infra Part V. 
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support for government regulation of false and misleading advertising—
something more problematic from a traditional First Amendment 
standpoint than is generally realized.  Let’s look at a few examples of 
advertising law as it is practiced. 
When Johnson & Johnson decided to name an antacid product 
“Mylanta Night Time Strength,” the Third Circuit said no.93  The 
product’s effects, the court noted, did not last all night—and surveys 
showed that the name had led a minority of consumers to believe that it 
would.94  When Tropicana sought to advertise its orange juice as “pure, 
pasteurized juice as it comes from the orange,” using an image of an 
Olympic athlete squeezing an orange into a Tropicana carton, the 
Second Circuit said no.95  The court found the slogan misleading because 
the juice was—as explicitly stated—pasteurized, and thus not “as it 
comes from the orange.”96  Notwithstanding that any claim of literal 
falsity would have been dubious, the court noted based on survey results 
that “a not insubstantial number of consumers were clearly misled.”97 
When General Motors (GM) advertised a car at the NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament by first pointing out that Lew Alcindor (by then 
known as Kareem Abdul-Jabbar) had been three times voted MVP at 
that tournament and then stating that the Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight had 
been three times named to the Consumers Digest Best Buy list, the 
Ninth Circuit saw a sufficient possibility of consumer confusion as to 
leave it to a jury whether GM should have to pay damages to Abdul-
Jabbar.98  Again, there was plainly no literal falsity; but the context, the 
court felt, could cause the viewer to infer an endorsement that Abdul-
Jabbar had not made.99 
These examples could be multiplied indefinitely.  Not every false 
advertising case ends in an injunction limiting speech based on a mere 
 
93.  Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharm. 
Co., 290 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2002). 
94.  Id. at 590–95.  The court also explained that the brand name implied that the 
product had been “specially made to work at night,” notwithstanding that it was in fact 
merely a more powerful version of the ordinary Mylanta product.  Id. at 589. 
95.  Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 314 (2d Cir. 1982).   
96.  Id. at 318. 
97.  Id. at 317.  The court added as further support for its holding the fact that 
Tropicana’s juice was sometimes frozen—not merely “squeezed, heated and packaged.”  Id. 
at 318. 
98.  Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996); see also White 
v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1402 (9th Cir. 1992). 
99.  Adbul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 410–13. 
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possibility of confusion.100  The key point to take away here, though, is 
that conventional consumer protection law can lead to bans on speech 
even in the absence of literal falsity, even where there is no direct 
evidence that the speaker intended to mislead consumers, based on 
after-the-fact conclusions drawn from the survey-measured experience 
of actual consumers, and without regard to the fact that most of those 
consumers were not misled at all.101  
Sometimes disputes over the legality of advertising require courts to 
make challenging determinations—is it misleading for a company to 
describe its vegan (eggless) condiment as “Just Mayo”?102  In order to 
give consumers a predictable framework in which to buy consumer 
products, government regulation proscribes statements that—absent the 
regulatory action—could not reliably be considered misleading at all.  
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) thus has promulgated a 
complex definition of what it means for a food to be “organic”; the 
definition incorporates such components as a list of approved non-
organic ingredients that the agency deems to be without reasonably 
 
100.   See, e.g., Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 57 (2014). 
101.  In Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000), 
amended on rehearing by 209 F.3d 1032, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000), Judge Easterbrook 
took the position that a false-advertising claim should not lie simply because a substantial 
number of consumers misunderstood a statement that was straightforwardly correct, given 
the dictionary meanings of its constituent words.  Mead Johnson, 209 F.3d at 1034.  A 
statement, he argued, does not “impl[y] something that is false” merely because consumers 
misunderstand it.  Id.  But this is not the majority view; indeed, it is “fundamentally at odds 
with the accepted uses of extrinsic state of mind evidence of deception in advertising cases.”  
Richard J. Leighton, Making Puffery Determinations in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases: 
Surveys, Dictionaries, Judicial Edicts and Materiality Tests, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 615, 628 
(2005).  Rather, notwithstanding that an advertising statement may be “literally true and 
grammatically correct,” the question of deception turns on “what does the person to whom 
the advertisement is addressed find to be the message?”  Am. Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co, 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  See generally Shari Seidman Diamond 
& David J. Franklyn, Trademark Surveys: An Undulating Path, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2029 (2014); 
Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449 
(2012). 
102.   See Stephanie Strom, F.D.A. Allows Maker of Just Mayo to Keep Product’s Name, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2015, at B2, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/business/fda-allows-
maker-of-just-mayo-to-keep-products-name.html [https://perma.cc/CTV8-BJZ9].  Similarly, is 
it misleading for a company to refer to seaweed-based carageenan as “gelatin”?  Does it 
matter that ordinary consumers (surveys reveal) don’t know how “gelatin” conventionally is 
made and thus arguably cannot be confused by the characterization?  See Rebecca Tushnet, It 
Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech 
Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 236 (2007) (discussing Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Del 
Monte Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
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available organic substitutes.103  That list, and other elements of the 
definition, involves contested policy choices.104  The law treats it as 
uncontroversial that the government can rely on those choices to set its 
own definition of what it means to be “organic” and bar as “misleading” 
any alternative uses of the word.  
The FDA has taken the position that it may be misleading—and 
therefore unprotected by the First Amendment—for a milk producer to 
(accurately) label its milk as “from cows not treated with rbST.”105  
Without “proper context,” the agency has explained, such statements 
may misleadingly imply that milk from untreated cows is safer or better 
than milk from treated cows.106  The agency therefore recommends that 
any such statement be accompanied by statements such as a disclaimer 
that “[n]o significant difference has been shown between milk derived 
from rbST-treated and non-rbST-treated cows.”107 
This is not how things work in the world of ordinary speech.  The 
first notable point here is the irrelevance of intent in advertising 
regulation.108  There is no scienter requirement under the federal 
Lanham Act that governs false advertising and trademark claims, nor is 
there under state consumer protection statutes.109  Similarly, suits for 
defamation and commercial disparagement are not subjected to the 
Sullivan or Gertz standards if the offending statements are deemed to be 
commercial speech.110 
The First Amendment, though, ordinarily disfavors regimes under 
which “an honest speaker[] . . . may accidentally incur liability for 
 
103.  Tushnet, supra note 102, at 241 (citing 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.300 to .301 (2007)). 
104.   See id. 
105.   Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from 
Cows That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 
6279, 6280 (Feb. 17, 1994). 
106.  Id. 
107.   Id.  In International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 648 (6th Cir. 
2010), the Sixth Circuit struck down an Ohio law prohibiting compositional claims including 
“from cows not treated with rbST.”  It upheld the power of the state, however, to require 
disclaimers such as the one suggested by the FDA.  Id. at 650.   
108.   Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech 
Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 294, 308 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008). 
109.   See id. 
110.   See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1990).  Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974), ruled that a state cannot impose defamation 
liability for a statement the defendant reasonably believed to be true.  New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), held that a state cannot impose liability for defamation 
of a public official or a public figure except in cases where the speaker knew that his 
statements were false or acted in reckless disregard of whether they were false. 
 2016] ON COMMERCIAL—AND CORPORATE—SPEECH 575 
speaking.”111  Even literally false and socially harmful statements will 
often be protected if uttered innocently—as the Court explained in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, that protection is part of the “breathing 
space” that freedom of expression needs in order to survive.112  The 
Constitution forbids the state to sanction political candidates, even for 
plain falsehoods, if they are made in good faith.113  When it comes to 
subversive advocacy, speech is protected unless it is “intended, and 
likely, to incite imminent lawless action.”114  In defamation or privacy 
actions, the Court has stated, states cannot impose liability without mens 
rea; the alternative would risk “serious impairment of the indispensable 
service of a free press.”115  In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court saw 
it as the sine qua non of constitutionality for a state cross-burning statute 
that it require direct evidence of intent to intimidate.116   
Ordinary First Amendment law, moreover, is hostile to any regime 
in which it is difficult to predict whether speech will incur legal sanction.  
Speech can be regulated only by “a precise statute ‘evincing a legislative 
judgment that certain specific conduct be . . . proscribed.”117  
Uncertainly-bounded prohibitions may “trap the innocent”;118 
alternatively, the fear of liability will chill speakers from engaging in 
speech that the legislature had not felt it necessary to prohibit, and that 
indeed the legislature could not have prohibited even had it wanted 
to.119   
 
111.   United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  Leslie Kendrick has suggested that the importance given to speakers’ intent is 
connected to autonomy theories of free speech; that might mesh with the law’s de-
emphasizing intent in commercial speech regulation where autonomy-based theories do not 
play a role.  See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 
1278–86 (2014). 
112.   376 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
113.   See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61–62 (1982). 
114.   Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
115.   Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967). 
116.   538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003).  Similarly, in United States v. Elonis, No. 13-983, slip 
op. at 13–17 (U.S. June 1, 2015), the Supreme Court relied on statutory interpretation to 
reverse a lower court’s ruling that a speaker violates 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) simply by 
transmitting in interstate commerce a statement that a reasonable person would see as a 
threat to injure the person of another. 
117.   Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1972) (quoting Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963)). 
118.   Id. at 108. 
119.   See generally Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1 (1989); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
1101, 1169 (1993). 
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Contemporary regulation of misleading advertising, however, shows 
little of this concern for predictability.  One cannot say with any 
assurance whether the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will find an 
advertisement to contain a misleading claim.120  Examples of prohibited 
speech, from the Tushnet & Goldman advertising law casebook, include 
“[a]n ad portraying a broken, hard-to-find toy being replaced because 
the toy had been purchased with a particular credit card, when the credit 
card company did not replace broken goods but merely refunded the 
purchase price”;121 “[a]dvertisements for a pain reliever that, in claiming 
to have twice as much pain reliever as the leading analgesic, implied that 
it had twice as much pain reliever as all commonly available pain 
relievers”;122 and “[c]laims that Geritol would cure tiredness caused by 
‘iron deficiency anemia,’ when most tired people have no such 
deficiency.”123  None of these results can be derived mechanically. 
First Amendment law does not typically decide whether speech is 
protected by embarking on a post hoc inquiry about the actual effects of 
a given message on segments of its target audience.124  In defamation 
cases, the courts ask whether a “reasonable person” could understand a 
statement as asserting a statement of verifiable fact, not whether actual 
people in fact did.125  Yet as I noted earlier, suits by one competitor 
against another for false advertising routinely are driven by survey 
results126—how did consumers in fact respond to the advertisement in 
question?  That approach has the important benefit of zeroing in on 
false advertising law’s core concern—are consumers being confused?—
but it does so by subordinating concerns about predictability that 
dominate in ordinary First Amendment law. 
Part of the challenge of false advertising law is that, in a world of 
distracted and inattentive consumers, almost any statement may leave 
some consumers with the wrong impression.127  The law, thus, does not 
 
120.   See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), in which the advertiser 
unsuccessfully makes this argument, although not in a First Amendment context. 
121.   REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN, ADVERTISING & MARKETING LAW: 
CASE AND MATERIALS 306 (2d ed. 2014). 
122.  Id. at 307. 
123.   Id. 
124.   See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468–69 (2007) (plurality opinion); 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 803–04. 
125.   See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 861–63 (9th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1061 (1999). 
126.   See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
127.   See Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. 
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provide for liability if only a trivial number of consumers are confused.  
Its threshold, rather, is confusion on the part of a “substantial number” 
of consumers—a figure commonly set at 15%–20%.128  Thus, if an 
advertiser states that its product cures tiredness caused by “iron 
deficiency anemia” and as much as 15%–20% of its target audience 
understand the statement, in context, to convey the false message that 
the product will cure their own tiredness, then the statement may be 
actionable under the Lanham Act.  But that is not the approach of 
conventional First Amendment thinking, which would see the fact that 
80%–85% of consumers were not confused as an ironclad argument that 
the speech was constitutionally protected.129 
More fundamentally, it is a commonplace of ordinary First 
Amendment law that government can regulate speech on the basis of its 
content only in cases of extreme necessity—only where the interests the 
government seeks to serve are compelling and the speech restriction is 
the unavoidable, “actually necessary,” least restrictive means to 
vindicate those interests.130  Regulation of blatantly false commercial 
speech seems to satisfy that test.  
But it is hardly “necessary” for the government to adopt elaborate 
rules to prescribe, say, whether a beer can be labeled “organic” if made 
with non-organic hops, and then to punish brewers who describe their 
product in a way that diverges from the government’s judgments.  It is, I 
think, useful and indeed desirable for government to do so—absent 
some definitional enterprise like the one the government has engaged 
in, consumers would be hard-pressed in evaluating producer claims that 
their products are organic and in using that criterion to choose among 
different products.131  The USDA definition, while arbitrary, gives 
consumers something to work with and producers a standard to live up 
to.  But it is not the only possible means the government could have 
                                                                                                                                           
L. REV. 737, 743 (2007). 
128.   See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 63, 98 n.127 (2009); see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 
2d 339, 345–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).  But see Mobileye, Inc. v. Picitup Corp., 928 F. Supp. 2d 759, 777 (S.D.N.Y 
2013) (9.2% is not “insubstantial as a matter of law”). 
129.  Daniel J. Gervais & Julia Latsko, Who Cares About the 85 Percent? Reconsidering 
Survey Evidence of Online Confusion in Trademark Cases, 96 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 265, (2014) (urging that trademark law should not ignore the interests of non-confused 
consumers). 
130.   See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548–51 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
131.   For a more sophisticated discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 102, at 238–48. 
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chosen to address this problem, and it would not pass a strict scrutiny 
test. 
Nor do other aspects of consumer protection law follow in ordinary 
First Amendment tracks.  Only because the usual First Amendment 
rules are suspended can a Treasury Department regulator reject 
proposed labels for “King of Hearts” or “St. Paula’s Liquid Wisdom” 
beer (the latter featuring an image of the 1898 painting The Conversion 
of Paula by Saint Jerome) on the ground that those names and labels 
imply forbidden health or medical claims.132 
The FTC routinely requires firms to provide substantiation for their 
advertising claims on the theory that “a firm’s failure to possess and rely 
upon a reasonable basis for objective claims constitutes an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice” under § 5 of the FTC Act.133  But for 
government to require speakers to establish the truth of their claims 
reverses the usual First Amendment burden of proof.134   
The challenges don’t abate when we shift our attention from false 
advertising law to ordinary trademark law.  Trademark infringement 
involves a person’s use of a word or mark in a way “likely to cause 
 
132.   See Tim Mak, Meet the Beer Bottle Dictator, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/12/meet-the-beer-bottle-dictator.html [https://p
erma.cc/RQ6Z-PXV6]. 
133.  FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, as reprinted in In re 
Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984); see also FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, 
Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2010). 
134.   I could go on.  Ordinary First Amendment law calls upon government to interfere 
with speech to the least extent possible and, thus, even some commercial speech cases state 
that government should not simply ban speech where mandating a disclaimer would do the 
job less intrusively.  See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also infra note 147 and 
accompanying text.  But commercial speech does not follow this rule consistently.  Courts, 
after all, will rely on survey evidence in private Lanham Act litigation that a firm’s advertising 
is misleading notwithstanding that the surveys didn’t test the effect of disclosures.  See 
Tushnet, supra note 127, at 754. 
 Ordinary First Amendment law calls for independent appellate review of lower-court 
findings that speech is sanctionable; commercial speech law includes no comparable doctrine.  
See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1196–97 (1988). 
 The trademark cause of action for dilution does not require that speech be false or 
misleading at all, and its constitutionality is at the very least questionable.  See Mary 
LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial 
Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 709–10 (2007); Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of 
Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 212, 294–97 (2013); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty 
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 561 (2008).  But I’ll 
not stress that point here.  Part of the tension I emphasize in this Article is that false 
advertising and trademark law, in general, are both substantively desirable and inconsistent 
with ordinary First-Amendment thinking.  By contrast, I do not see dilution law as a good 
thing. 
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confusion . . . or to deceive” consumers about the origin or sponsorship 
of the speaker’s goods or services.135  Trademark infringement is thus “a 
specific type of false advertising.”136  The Supreme Court has found 
trademark law unexceptional because the “Government constitutionally 
may regulate ‘deceptive or misleading’ commercial speech.”137 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, thus, trademark law does not play by the 
usual First Amendment rules.138  Once again, as with the law of false 
advertising, one can be held liable for trademark infringement despite 
having had no intention to deceive or mislead.139  Indeed, because 
trademark law ties liability to a defendant’s use of a mark in 
circumstances creating a likelihood of confusion, a court can find 
liability for speech even where there is neither evidence that the 
defendant intended to confuse, nor evidence that any flesh-and-blood 
consumer in fact was confused.140  This is utterly unexceptional in 
trademark law but ought to raise an eyebrow among First Amendment 
lawyers. 
I said earlier that First Amendment law does not rely on audience 
reaction to decide whether speech is protected.141  At the same time, 
 
135.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
136.   Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, and 
Corporate Reputation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1457, 1475 (2009). 
137.   S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 n.12 (1987) 
(quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
138.   I’m here referring to routine, everyday applications of trademark law, not simply 
those challenges that seem especially First Amendment-y because they involve the incidental 
use of trademarks in expressive works.  For one of those, see Radiance Foundation, Inc. v. 
NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2015). 
139.   In practice, a finding of bad faith intent-to-confuse is almost always fatal to a 
trademark defendant’s case.  Courts, however, commonly find infringement even in the 
absence of bad faith.  See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1610, 1611 tbl.4 (2006).  Courts routinely 
ask, as one of several factors to be balanced in trademark infringement cases, whether bad 
intent was present, but of the cases in the study sample finding a likelihood of confusion, 
approximately one-third found the “intent” factor to be neutral or to favor the defendant.  Id. 
140.   See id. at 1604.  Of the cases in Beebe’s sample in which the court found for 
plaintiff on the similarity-of-the-marks factor but found no evidence of bad faith intent or 
actual confusion, plaintiff prevailed in roughly half.  Id.  Key considerations in the courts’ 
ultimate likelihood-of-confusion determinations were the proximity of the goods (e.g., if 
plaintiff sells computers, the public is more likely to be confused if defendant sells computer 
accessories under a mark similar to plaintiff’s than if it sells food products under the same 
mark) and the strength of plaintiff’s mark (i.e., whether the mark is intrinsically well-suited to 
uniquely identifying a particular firm—the public is more likely to be confused as to the 
source if both products are called Quixip than if both are called Quality).  Id. at 1606 fig.3. 
141.   See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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First Amendment jurisprudence usually looks for bad consequences 
before imposing sanctions on speech.142  Thus, it disfavors presumed 
damages for defamation.143  Absent a showing of bad intent, we do not 
rely on any “likelihood” that defamation caused harm to reputation; 
First Amendment law in that context calls for a showing of actual 
harm.144  The Justices in the Pentagon Papers case, similarly, rejected 
judicial relief based on mere “surmise or conjecture that untoward 
consequences may result” from the papers’ release.145  Circumstances 
where ordinary First Amendment law both dispenses with bad intention 
and is willing to presume harm without a separate requirement of proof 
fall in the realm of dire emergency or grievous injury—child 
pornography, say, or revealing “the sailing dates of transports” during 
wartime.146  The use of a trademark in circumstances where consumer 
confusion is deemed “likely” is not that.  Indeed, the disparity is all the 
more clear given that trademark law forbids trademark uses even in 
cases where any confusion that might take place will have no effect on 
actual consumer purchasing decisions.147 
 
142.   See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–50 (1974) (concluding courts 
may not award presumed damages in defamation cases absent a showing that defendant 
published the offending statement with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the 
truth).  
143.   See id. 
144.   See id.  In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 
(1985), to be sure, a splintered Court held that presumed damages were permissible without a 
heightened scienter showing where the offending speech was credit reporting disseminated to 
a small number of subscribers and not involving “matters of public concern.”  In doing so, 
though, the plurality emphasized the similarity of that speech to commercial speech.  Id. at 
758 n.5, 762. 
145.  N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 725–26 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  Notably, the Pentagon Papers case involved the legitimacy of an 
injunction against speech—a so-called prior restraint.  That does not undercut my point, 
though.  Prior restraints are disfavored in First Amendment law in part precisely because they 
may be entered without any showing of actual harm (necessarily so, because the feared harm 
has not happened yet).  See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central 
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 49 (1981) (“When adjudication precedes initial dissemination, 
the communication cannot be judged by its actual consequences . . . .  The adjudicative 
assessment of speech value versus social harm must be made in the abstract, based on 
speculation or generalizations . . . .”).  And notably as well, trademark and false-advertising 
injunctions may also be classed as prior restraints. 
146.   Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).  The well-known Brandenburg test for subversive 
advocacy (i.e., speech advocating violence) does incorporate the likelihood that violence will 
result but also requires affirmative intention to bring about that violence.  See supra note 114 
and accompanying text. 
147.   See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 413 (2010); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark 
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We might imagine that First Amendment law does not apply in the 
trademark context because trademarks are property.  But the mere 
claim of property rights does not “render free speech issues invisible.”148 
Free speech guarantees can’t be avoided simply by characterizing 
a speech restriction as an “intellectual property law.” . . . [A] bill 
introduced in the 104th Congress would have declared the 
United States flag copyrighted, and would have imposed 
“criminal penalties for the destruction of a copyrighted flag.”  
Congress can’t get around the First Amendment merely by 
characterizing otherwise protected speech as treading on a 
property interest, as the flag copyright bill sought to do.  One still 
has to ask whether these intellectual property laws are 
unconstitutional speech restrictions . . . .149 
Courts have referred to reputation as a property right,150 but that has not 
stood in the way of First Amendment limitations on the tort law cause 
of action designed to vindicate individual interests in reputation.151  
The disjunction between ordinary First Amendment law and the 
laws of trademark and false advertising, moreover, is deeper.  In the 
ultimate analysis, advertising (and trademark) regulation is based on an 
understanding of how people respond to speech that is fundamentally 
different from that of ordinary First Amendment law.152  “The premise 
of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep 
nor fools.”153  Ordinary First Amendment law assumes that listeners will 
                                                                                                                                           
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67 (2012). 
 Further, notwithstanding the usual First Amendment rule that government should 
interfere with speech to the least extent possible (so that even some commercial speech cases 
state that government should not simply ban speech where mandating a disclaimer would do 
the job less intrusively), see supra note 134, courts’ default response to trademark 
infringement is a ban on the offending speech, not an order requiring an appropriate 
disclaimer.  See Tushnet, supra note 127, at 748. 
148.   Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 182 & n.163 (1998) (quoting Wendy J. Gordon, 
A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993)). 
149.  Id. at 182–83 (footnotes omitted). 
150.   See id. 182 & n.164. 
151.   See id.; see also Christine Bohannon, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1123 (2010); Tushnet, supra note 127, at 746.  Indeed, the property 
analogy is imperfect on its own terms because the law of trespass to chattels at least requires a 
showing of actual harm to the property in which plaintiff claims an interest.  Bohannon, 
supra, at 1125–26. 
152.   See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 254–57. 
153.   McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258–59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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respond to speech in rational ways.154  That is why, we believe, 
“discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine.”155  That is why we say “that the path 
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances 
and proposed remedies, and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is 
good ones.”156 
Ordinary First Amendment doctrine rests on the model of the 
rational listener157 because it is rational listeners who populate our 
aspirational marketplace of ideas in which “who ever knew Truth put to 
the wors[t?]”158  The marketplace metaphor assumes that people process 
speech on a rational level, and make reasoned judgments about it, 
rather than responding confusedly or irrationally.159  The assumed 
marketplace-of-ideas participant is “a robust, self-determining agent 
fully capable of placing true information in whatever context might be 
necessary in order to decide whether or not to act upon it.”160  Indeed, 
some argue, failure to incorporate this understanding of the listener into 
First Amendment law is to reject the idea of rational self-governance 
itself and, thus, the democratic ideal.161 
By contrast, consumer protection and trademark law are explicitly 
paternalistic.  The law prohibits misleading commercial speech where it 
appears likely that even a minority of consumers will be confused.162  
Yet “[i]magine . . . the moderator at a Meiklejohnian town meeting 
ruling a speaker out of order because his ideas were ‘misleading.’”163  
Far from taking for granted the “imagined supremely competent 
audience”164 of ordinary First Amendment law, consumer protection law 
assumes that “the public lacks sophistication”165—that “the buying 
 
154.   Lidsky, supra note 124, at 815–16. 
155.   Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
156.   Id. 
157.   Lidsky, supra note 124, at 809–16. 
158.   JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in IV THE WORKS OF JOHN 
MILTON 293, 347 (Frank A. Patterson et al. eds., 1931). 
159.   Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1143–44 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech 
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 135 (1989)). 
160.   Sullivan, supra note 60, at 156. 
161.   See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 124, at 840. 
162.   See supra notes 135–40 and accompanying text. 
163.   See Post, supra note 89, at 36. 
164.   Tushnet, supra note 102, at 257. 
165.   In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350, 383 (1977)) (suggesting that the public in particular lacks sophistication regarding legal 
services).  
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public will [not] exercise great selectivity and caution in what they 
choose to believe of what they hear and read.”166 
In order to protect confused members of the buying public, the law 
imposes liability without fault, in a manner difficult to predict, often in 
contexts where it could not be said that liability is unavoidable to 
vindicate compelling state needs.167  “[T]he consumer is not expected to 
have the competence or access to information needed to question the 
advertiser’s claim, and correction is not to be left to competitors and 
mere government counterspeech.”168 
Recall my earlier discussion of the complex USDA definition of 
what it means for a food to be organic.169  How is government to embark 
on that sort of project?  Because organic has no predefined meaning, 
government has to pour meaning into the word in order to protect 
consumers from vendors using it fraudulently, and the only way to do 
that is for government to figure out what organic should mean—what a 
sensible, intelligent, informed consumer who values organic food would 
want it to mean.  But by definition here government is not taking 
consumers as it finds them.  It has to decide what a right-thinking 
consumer ought to expect from an organic-labeled food based on its 
own evaluation of what is meaningful about being organic and what 
isn’t.  There is no way to avoid the paternalism in that project.170 
Justice Blackmun’s explanation for false advertising law’s apparent 
First Amendment free pass was that commercial advertising might be 
more easily verifiable by its distributor than other speech and is less 
likely to be chilled.171  But neither of these rationales holds up on 
examination.  Whether advertising is misleading, and thus unprotected, 
is in fact not easily verifiable at all; “distinguishing deceptive from 
nondeceptive advertising . . . may require resolution of exceedingly 
complex and technical factual issues and the consideration of nice 
questions of semantics.”172  Is “Glass Wax” a misleading name for a car 
polish that contains no wax?  Nothing in the advertiser’s special 
 
166.   Sullivan, supra note 60, at 156 n.121 (quoting United States v. Articles of Drug, 
etc., 263 F. Supp. 212, 216 (D. Neb. 1967)). 
167.   See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
168.   Sullivan, supra note 60, at 156. 
169.   See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
170.   See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 243. 
171.   Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
772 n.24 (1976). 
172.   Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985). 
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knowledge provides an answer to this question.173  Even the issue of 
whether advertising is factually false may not be at all clear.  An 
advertiser may be sanctioned for scientific claims that do not relate to its 
own product at all, but rather to a competitor’s.174  Other 
noncommercial speech that is easily verifiable—say, statements about 
the flatness of the earth or purported photographs of the President 
meeting with space aliens—is not subjected to a different First 
Amendment standard on that account.175 
Nor is there much to the argument that commercial advertising is 
unusually durable or resilient.176  Yes, advertising is an essential tool in 
the pursuit of profit, but so is the noncommercial speech embodied in 
for-profit television broadcasting, book publishing, or movie making.  
Speech about religion, say, might also be thought to be durable.  Nor 
does commercial advertising’s purported durability explain why judges 
should suddenly shift away from an ordinary First Amendment model in 
which consumers must be given the autonomy to weigh purportedly 
misleading speech for themselves.177  
One response to this contradiction might be for the Court to hold—
as some academics have urged—that government lacks power to 
regulate misleading advertising.178  But the Court has shown no interest 
in doing that.179  And that’s a good thing.  While some features of 
current trademark law are undesirable,180 and some aspects of current 
consumer protection law are over the top,181 both trademark law and 
consumer protection law on balance work well.  And they could not 
exist in anywhere near their current form if we applied conventional 
First Amendment rules. 
The reality is that if the law left sellers free to engage in the 
“sophisticated deception” of “innuendo, indirect intimations, and 
 
173.   See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 232. 
174.   See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2014). 
175.   See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 627, 635–37 (1990); Post, supra note 89, at 37; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment 
and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1212, 1218 & n.37 (1983). 
176.  See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 175, at 637–38; Shiffrin, supra note 175, at 1218. 
177.  See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 175, at 634–38; Shiffrin, supra note 175, at 1218. 
178.   See, e.g., Post, supra note 89, at 35–41.  Dean Post would allow regulation in limited 
contexts where the evaluation of commercial information “requires unusual expertise” or 
there is special reason to doubt consumer autonomy.  Id. at 41. 
179.   See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
180.   See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
181.   See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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ambiguous suggestions,”182 it would leave the public worse off.  The 
theory of the marketplace of ideas, in which consumers are mythological 
“idealized speech-evaluators,”183 does not describe how consumers in 
fact respond to speech.  In a world without effective bars against 
misleading advertising, intelligent consumers would eventually avoid 
deception by learning that nothing said in an advertisement was to be 
trusted, but that wouldn’t be a good result either: it would only deny the 
producers of superior products any way to distinguish themselves via 
their speech to the public.184 
The moral—as Rebecca Tushnet has emphasized185—is that the law 
of speech used to sell commercial products can protect the interests of 
consumers or it can conform to conventional First Amendment rules, 
but it cannot do both.  We have chosen a body of law that, by and large, 
promotes accurate consumer understanding even where doing so 
effectively requires ordinary First Amendment doctrine to give way.  
Not all aspects of that body of law are perfect; but it has been in place 
for many decades, and it works tolerably well.  From a policy 
perspective, it seems straightforward.  From the standpoint of First 
Amendment law, though, it presents a paradox.  That’s the knot we 
have to unravel. 
IV. CORPORATE SPEECH 
We can better understand the commercial speech puzzle if we look 
at it in the context of the law of corporate speech in general.  Here, the 
foundational case is First National Bank v. Bellotti,186 decided just two 
years after Virginia Board.187  But to understand Bellotti, we need to 
take a step back and consider how the free speech rights of corporate 
entities came to be at issue. 
Corporate speech is a hot issue these days because a few years ago, 
in Citizens United v. FEC,188 the Supreme Court struck down a federal 
law restricting for-profit corporations’ ability to speak in connection 
 
182.   Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978). 
183.   See Tushnet, supra note 108, at 312. 
184.   See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 253; see also Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing 
and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 99–129 (2006); George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
“Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
185.   See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 257. 
186.   435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
187.  425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
188.   558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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with candidate elections.189  The law, the Court told us, was baldly 
unconstitutional, impermissibly depriving a corporation of “the right to 
use speech . . . to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speakers’ 
voice.”190  The majority and the dissenters in Citizens United differed 
over whether the First Amendment forbade Congress to restrict speech 
by for-profit corporations, paid for with corporate treasury funds, that 
advocates the election or defeat of a political candidate and is 
disseminated via broadcast, cable, or satellite immediately before an 
election.191  But they agreed about corporations’ ability to rely on the 
 
189.  Id. at 372.   The statutory provision, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), on its face imposed 
restrictions on both for-profit and nonprofit corporations.  The Court had interpreted the 
provision, though, to exempt nonprofit corporations that were “formed for the express 
purpose of promoting political ideas,” had no shareholders with a claim on their assets or 
earnings, and received no contributions from for-profit corporations or unions.  FEC v. Mass. 
Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
209–11 (2003) (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264).  The key impact of the law, thus, was on for-
profit corporations, unions, and entities funded by for-profit corporations and unions. 
190.   Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41. 
191.   I do not intend in this Article to spend any significant time on the merits of the 
Citizens United decision.  I will say here that in my view the dissenters had the better side of 
the debate—that Congress had power to enact its regulation even assuming the full First 
Amendment status of corporate speech.  That matter has been addressed in many other 
places at far greater length than here.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); Steven L. Winter, Citizens 
Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133 (2011) (calling the Court’s conflation of individual and 
corporate speech rights “dangerously oversimplified”).  Very briefly: the restriction at issue in 
Citizens United addressed the dissemination, via broadcast, cable, or satellite, in the time 
period shortly before an election, of communications “susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate” by for-profit 
corporations using their general treasury funds (or by other entities that were the recipients 
of those funds).  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–25 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 
U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007)); see also 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2006); id. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (drawing a 
distinction between treasury and political action committee (PAC) funds); Wis. Right to Life, 
551 U.S. at 465–69 (explaining when speech should be deemed “the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy”); MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–65 (holding that the law does not apply to 
nonprofit advocacy groups accepting no contributions from business corporations, even 
where the nonprofit groups take corporate form).  The Court majority began its 
condemnation of the law by explaining that the First Amendment “[p]rohibit[s]” any 
“restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not 
others.”  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.  As the dissenters explained, though, this is 
unfounded: government imposes different speech restrictions on the incarcerated and the 
free, the military service member and the civilian, the government employee and the member 
of the private sector, the student and the nonstudent, the foreigner and the citizen.  Id. at 420 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Indeed, if government could not 
distinguish between corporate and individual speakers, then well-established federal 
securities law would be called into question.  See Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and 
the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 871 (2007).  While a variety of 
distinctions can be offered to justify different treatment of individuals and corporations 
speaking with treasury funds, it is sufficient at this juncture to point to the so-far-at-least well-
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First Amendment in the first place192: Justice Stevens in dissent felt it 
necessary to note that “[o]f course . . . no one suggests” that speech falls 
outside First Amendment protection simply because it comes from a 
corporation.193  
Post-Citizens United, others have challenged that consensus.  Some 
scholars have urged that corporations shouldn’t be seen as First 
Amendment rightsholders at all—that they are not “persons” within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and should not be able to assert 
First Amendment claims.194  Other scholars have characterized the 
Supreme Court’s regard for for-profit corporations’ First Amendment 
rights as a revival of Lochner for the modern age.195  So what about 
that?  Why should corporations’ speech be protected?  After all, as 
Justice Stevens put it, corporations “have no consciences, no beliefs, no 
feelings, no thoughts, no desires. . . . [T]hey are not themselves members 
of ‘We the People.’”196 
I should be clear that the real debate here is over expenditures by 
for-profit, non-media corporations.  Few today would contest that 
speech by organizations such as the League of Conservation Voters 
should enjoy First Amendment protection, notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                                                           
accepted ban on corporate contributions to political candidates, and to Congress’s 
understanding that corporate electioneering expenditures are viewed by donors, candidates, 
and the general public alike as functionally indistinguishable from contributions, raising the 
same danger of a corrupt relationship between government and business.  See Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 447–60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “A democracy 
cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and 
sold.”  Id. at 453; see also infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text.  But see Minn. Citizens 
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(suggesting that Citizens United leaves the ban on corporate contributions to political 
candidates “on shaky ground”).  See generally Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the 
Corporate Contribution Ban, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 397 (2015) (arguing that the corporate 
contribution ban should be upheld as reinforcing limits on individual contributions and 
protecting the rights of dissenting shareholders). 
192.   See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–41 (majority opinion); id. at 445 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
193.   Id. at 445 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
194.   See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: 
From Freedom of Association to Freedom of The Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 5, 39–51 (2012); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional 
Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221 (2011). 
195.   See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1119, 1148 (2015); Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2343, 2388–91 (2014); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New 
Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 198–203 (2014).  
196.   Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).   
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organization’s status as a corporation.197  Speech undertaken by an 
association of individuals who have come together for the purpose of 
promoting political ideas, and funded solely by those individuals, raises 
none of the issues that motivate public concern about for-profit 
corporations’ speech.198  Indeed, Supreme Court case law champions 
individuals’ ability to associate for just those political and advocacy 
purposes.199 
For-profit corporations, though, might present a different story.  The 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation means 
that—at least for the estimated 10% of American corporations, 
employing about half of the workforce, that are not closely held200—it is 
much less plain whether the entity’s expenditures for speech can or 
should be seen as emanating from the shareholders, whom we are to 
suppose have associated for purposes of funding this speech.  The 
shareholders are not directing this speech; they may or may not agree 
with it; except in the most unusual of cases, they could not stop it if they 
tried; and their contribution of funds to the entity has nothing to do with 
its speech activities.201 
Just as First Amendment protection for nonprofit corporations is 
uncontroversial, it is uncontroversial that members of the news media 
should be able to assert First Amendment protections.202  That is so even 
when they are organized as for-profit corporations.203  That point was 
adequately settled fifty years ago in New York Times v. Sullivan, when 
 
197.   See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (concluding that “the concerns underlying the 
regulation of corporate political activity are simply absent” when it comes to voluntary 
political associations in nonprofit corporate form). 
198.  See id.  
199.   See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958); see 
also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (White, J., dissenting). 
200.   See Alison Griswold, How Many People Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Affect?, 
SLATE: MONEYBOX BLOG (June 30, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2
014/06/30/hobby_lobby_supreme_court_ruling_how_many_people_work_at_closely_held_cor
porations.html [https://perma.cc/W84W-W4AX].  On the distinction between closely held and 
other corporations, see infra notes 415–17 and accompanying text. 
201.   See Anthony Kammer & Liz Kennedy, Who Decides When a Corporation Spends 
Money in Politics?, DEMOS (June 19, 2013), http://www.demos.org/publication/who-decides-
when-corporation-spends-money-politics [https://perma.cc/3NX8-UZZR]. 
202.   See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966). 
203.   The statutory provision struck down in Citizens United, thus, made plain that it did 
not restrict the media distribution of “any news story, commentary, or editorial.”  2 U.S.C. 
§§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006).  The legislative history indicates that Congress 
included that language in the statute so as to “assure[] the unfettered right of the newspapers, 
TV networks, and other media to cover and comment on political campaigns.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 93-1239, at 4 (1974). 
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the Court rejected the claim that the for-profit activity of the New York 
Times (a corporation) lessened its First Amendment protection against 
defamation liability.204  I’ll return to this question later on: Can we really 
so easily distinguish between media entities and other for-profit 
corporations?205  For now, though, I’ll focus on the constitutional 
protection of expenditures by for-profit, non-media corporations for the 
purpose of disseminating speech. 
A. The Significance of “Persons” 
I’ll get one issue quickly out of the way: at least as a textual matter, it 
won’t work to make the issue of constitutional protection for 
corporations’ speech depend on whether corporations are “persons.”206  
Stepping back from the First Amendment and looking to the 
Constitution as a whole, it seems plain that corporations should be able 
to assert some constitutional claims.  If a state law oversteps the 
Constitution’s federalism-based limitations on state power, such as the 
so-called Dormant Commerce Clause207 or the Article I, Section 10 
limitations on state authority,208 then it’s hard to imagine why a 
corporation ought not to be able to challenge that action.  The Supreme 
Court heard such claims by corporations early on.209  The Court even 
earlier allowed a corporation to argue that a state had unconstitutionally 
impaired the obligation of contracts; that decision came in 1819, just 
thirty years after the Constitution came into force.210 
 
204.   376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964). 
205.   See infra notes 406–12 and accompanying text. 
206.   For a contrary approach, see David H. Gans & Douglas T. Kendall, A Capitalist 
Joker: The Strange Origins, Disturbing Part, and Uncertain Future of Corporate Personhood in 
American Law, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643 (2011). 
207.   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
208.   Id. art. I, § 10. 
209.  See, e.g., Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867); Steamship Co. 
v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1864). 
210.   Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see also W. 
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).  The Contracts Clause was the most 
frequently litigated section of the Constitution during the nineteenth century.  See Barnitz v. 
Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 121 (1896). 
 In the Dartmouth College case, a 1769 charter had incorporated a corporate body under 
the name “The Trustees of Dartmouth College,” and it was that body that brought suit.  Trs. 
of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 624–26.  Under the law of the time, the trustees acting in their 
official capacities were constituted as a body corporate.  See id. at 635–39.  They were not 
acting to preserve their individual property; none of them had individual rights in the 
property of the corporation.  See id. at 639–43.  Rather, the corporation filed suit to vindicate 
its own rights.  Id. at 626–27. 
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While the federal government didn’t exercise its eminent domain 
power before the 1870s,211 and the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause 
wasn’t deemed to constrain the states until the very end of the 
nineteenth century,212 state courts at least as early as 1828 extended to 
corporations the benefit of the general principle that “compensation is a 
necessary attendant on the due and constitutional exercise of the power 
of the lawgiver to deprive an individual of his property without his 
consent.”213 
Immunizing state governments from corporations’ legal attacks, 
when they enact protectionist laws and impose trade barriers, would 
pointlessly undercut substantive constitutional law principles.  It would 
be odd to say that whether a protectionist state law is unconstitutional 
depends on whether the interstate businesses that it disadvantages take 
individual or corporate form.  And allowing governments arbitrarily to 
seize a corporation’s property without compensation would hurt 
shareholders in a way inconsistent with constitutional values.  
At the same time, corporations aren’t entitled to the same 
constitutional protections as individual human beings.  Most obviously, 
they’re not “citizens of the United States” within the meaning of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and cannot vote.214  They can’t assert a Fifth 
 
211.   William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 709 n.78 (1985). 
212.  Compare Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–41 (1897), 
with Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 
420, 539–40 (1837) (stating that absent a contracts clause violation, states did not violate the 
federal Constitution merely because they extinguished “antecedent vested rights of property” 
(quoting Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 110 (1834))). 
213.   Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Conn. River Co., 7 Conn. 28, 49 (1828); see also White 
River Tpk. Co. v. Vt. Cent. R.R., 21 Vt. 590, 595 (1849) (stating that plaintiffs comprising a 
corporation and complaining of a taking of the corporation’s property “are entitled to the 
same constitutional protection to their property, that an individual would be”).  Note that in 
these cases—in contrast to Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. 518—the courts addressed 
what we would today characterize as for-profit, closely held corporations and saw no 
distinction between the property of the corporation and that of the individuals who 
constituted it. 
214.  Nor is a corporation a “citizen” within the meaning of Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), or the Fourteenth Amendment’s parallel provision, Pembina 
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888).  A corporation can 
take advantage of Article III diversity jurisdiction, which by its terms is limited to 
controversies “between Citizens of different States”—but even in so ruling, Chief Justice 
Marshall was emphatic “[t]hat invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, 
a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen.”  Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 61, 86 (1809). 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.215  Granting 
corporations the right to vote in public elections would contravene basic 
constitutional values.  Reading the Constitution so that individuals were 
immunized from giving testimony that would incriminate their corporate 
employers would extend the Fifth Amendment privilege in ways that 
don’t follow from its underlying goals.216 
Should we draw the line between those contexts in which 
corporations may assert constitutional claims, and those in which they 
may not, by asking whether the constitutional clause in question 
specifies rights in “persons”?  Well, no.  The First Amendment doesn’t 
refer to “persons” at all—it simply provides that Congress may not 
make a “law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”217  So the argument 
that corporations shouldn’t have First Amendment rights because 
they’re not “persons” has no textual basis: from a textual perspective, 
the extent to which Congress can restrict corporate speech has nothing 
to do with their personhood.  The question is simply whether such 
legislation “abridg[es] the freedom of speech.”218 
Now, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does grant 
rights to “persons,”219 and therefore, the standard textual justification 
for imposing any Bill of Rights provision as a restriction on state 
governments requires that the rightsholder be a “person.”220  But it 
would be an odd sort of federalism, in 2014, that held that the national 
government faces constitutional restrictions in limiting corporate speech 
while the states do not.  Rather, the pervasive message of the modern 
incorporation cases is that the national government and the states are 
subject to identical Bill-of-Rights-derived constraints.221 
 
215.   Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 82–83 (1906).  On constitutional protections for 
corporations, see generally Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal 
Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in 
Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving 
Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629. 
216.   See Henning, supra note 215, at 816–21; Pollman, supra note 215, at 1648–49; see 
also Hale, 201 U.S. at 69–70. 
217.   U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
218.   But see infra note 414. 
219.   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
220.  See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188–89 
(1888). 
221.   See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Once it is decided that a 
particular Bill of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ the 
same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.” 
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968))); cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213–25 (1995) (finding that federal and state governments are subject to 
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I will suggest much later in this Article that the question whether we 
should view corporations as “persons” isn’t entirely misplaced.222  For 
now, though, the better question is whether allowing corporations to 
assert claims under a given constitutional provision advances the goals 
that that provision was designed to serve—put another way, whether 
restrictions on corporations’ speech abridge “the freedom of speech” 
that the amendment was designed to protect.223  That suggests that we 
should ask here whether treating corporations as First Amendment 
rightsholders advances First Amendment goals and what effect that 
constitutional understanding has on the overall system of free 
expression.   
B. Corporations and First Amendment Values 
So how should we understand for-profit, nonmedia corporations’ 
speech?  Would it make sense simply to declare it entirely outside the 
bounds of the First Amendment so that government could restrict it at 
will, perhaps even on content-based grounds?  After all, we don’t read 
the Constitution to provide blanket protection to anything at all that 
involves words and communication: otherwise, statutes criminalizing 
conspiracy, solicitation of crime, perjury, and espionage would be 
constitutionally problematic.224  Our First Amendment rules, rather, 
identify protected speech by looking to First Amendment values.225 
We protect speech in part because of its connection to individual 
self-fulfillment—because of the idea that that speech is crucial to the full 
realization of each individual’s character and potential as a human 
being.226  Put another way, we protect speech because it is a 
                                                                                                                                           
the same equal protection constraints, constitutional text notwithstanding). 
222.   See infra text accompanying notes 384–89. 
223.   See Pollman, supra note 215, at 1670–75; Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United, 
Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension Between Constitutional Law and 
Corporate Law, 6 UNIV. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 286–87 (2012). 
224.   See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961); ROBERT C. POST, 
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 2–3 (2012). 
225.  See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 3–15 (1966); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY 15–86 (1982); see also Greenawalt, supra note 159, at 121; Louis H. Mayo, The Free 
Forum: Development of a Democratic Forum in the Limited Media of Mass Communication, 
22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 393–94 (1954).  Some have argued that too strong a reliance on 
First Amendment “values” risks under protecting speech.  See CBS v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).  But see Frederick Schauer, 
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 279–80 
(1981). 
226.   See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970); 
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manifestation of individual freedom—“an integral part of the 
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of 
self.”227 
Protecting a for-profit corporation’s speech does not advance that 
goal.228  A for-profit corporation’s speech is driven not by individual 
personality but by shareholder return; it is disconnected from individual 
self-realization or the development of character.  It does not function to 
realize the speaker’s human potential.  It is not part of the questioning 
mind’s “affirmation of self.”229 
We protect speech in part because of its connection to political self-
government.  The process of talking about political issues is part of self-
government.230  In democracy, citizens through their collective speech 
shape a common democratic will: they constitute and reconstitute the 
public opinion that is “the final source of government in a democratic 
state.”231  Once again, though, a for-profit corporation’s speech is not 
part of that project of democratic determination because corporations 
(as distinguished from their owners and employees) are not citizens and 
thus are not part of the project of democratic self-governance.232 
On the other hand, corporate speech can connect to First 
Amendment values in other ways.  Speech promotes self-government 
whenever it informs the citizenry of information and arguments they 
need in order to govern themselves intelligently.233  Speech informing 
                                                                                                                                           
EMERSON, supra note 225, at 4–7; see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE 
UNITED STATES 33 (1941) (“The First Amendment protects . . . the need of many men to 
express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living . . . .”).  And for that 
matter, see MILTON, supra note 158, at 324 (licensing of the press is “the greatest displeasure 
and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him”). 
227.   First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 
EMERSON, supra note 225, at 5). 
228.   See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (“To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of 
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality. . . . It is recognized that corporate 
free speech rights do not arise because corporations . . . have any interest in self-
expression.”); see also Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 24, at 14–15 (discussing commercial 
speech). 
229.   See C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976). 
230.   See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). 
231.   Post, supra note 89, at 7 (quoting Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917)); see also Robert C. Post, The Constitutional 
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 639, 671 (1990). 
232.  See C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial 
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004). 
233.   If the citizens who are to decide an issue “are denied acquaintance with 
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the public about the abuse of official power is “the most potent of all 
restraints upon misgovernment.”234  Indeed, not only when it comes to 
matters of self-government but also with respect to ideas and 
information generally, speech is said to facilitate the search for truth.235  
All this is true without regard to the identity of the speaker. 
In the 1978 case of First National Bank v. Bellotti,236 the Court struck 
down a Massachusetts statute making it illegal for a wide range of 
corporations to spend money in order to “influenc[e] or affect[] the vote 
on any question submitted to the voters [via referendum], other than 
one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the 
corporation.”237  Justice Powell’s majority opinion emphasized that for-
profit corporations’ speech serves First Amendment values in the ways I 
have just described.238  Corporations as well as individuals can 
contribute political argument and information to the public store.  
Information relevant to a political issue can as well come from a 
corporate source as from an individual one: “The inherent worth of the 
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend 
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, 
or individual.”239  Rather than merely protecting individual self-
expression, the Bellotti Court held, the First Amendment “prohibit[s] 
government from limiting the stock of information from which members 
of the public may draw.”240  No matter what its source, if speech is 
                                                                                                                                           
information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, . . . the 
result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good.”  ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948). 
234.  Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also Vincent Blasi, The 
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 616 (quoting 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)); see also First Nat’l Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam); 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 
(1966); Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html [https://perma.cc/Y2Q4-X54F]. 
235.   See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market[place of ideas] . . . .”).  See generally Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., Free 
Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First 
Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 188–94 (1972). 
236.   435 U.S. 765. 
237.   MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977), quoted in Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
at 768 n.2. 
238.   Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781–83. 
239.  Id. at 777. 
240.   Id. at 783. 
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silenced, then the community loses the contribution that speech would 
have made.241 
Moreover—the Court continued—whatever the source of speech, its 
regulation allows government to skew the public debate by substituting 
the fiat of government officials for the competition of ideas.242  “To be 
sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this 
would be its purpose.  But the fact that advocacy may persuade the 
electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.”243  In sum, the Bellotti Court 
concluded, speech does not lose its First Amendment protection “simply 
because its source is a corporation.”244 
Bellotti was decided two years after Virginia Board,245 and Justice 
Powell’s majority opinion—perhaps unsurprisingly—echoes the points 
Justice Blackmun had made in that earlier case.246  Powell cites Virginia 
Board three times,247 quoting it twice.248  Arguably, the First 
Amendment claim in Bellotti was the more vulnerable one.  In Virginia 
Board, the challenged government rule applied to every pharmacist in 
the state, regardless of his or her employer;249 it was plain that 
pharmacists were First Amendment speakers, and the only question was 
whether their rights extended to commercial speech.250  In Bellotti, by 
contrast, Justice Rehnquist in dissent was convinced that a corporation 
had no right to engage in speech except that necessarily incidental to its 
business.251  As a creature of the state, he urged, a corporation 
“possesse[d] only those properties which the charter of creation 
confer[ed] upon it.”252  But Justice Rehnquist lost, in significant part 
 
241.   See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin 
Books 1974) (1859). 
242.   See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–77 & n.11, 784–85; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other 
ideas.”); see also SCHAUER, supra note 225, at 81–86; Lidsky, supra note 124, at 817–18. 
243.   Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790. 
244.   Id. at 784; see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 533–35 
(1980). 
245.   Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
246.   Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–95. 
247.   Id. at 783, 784 n.20, 791 n.31. 
248.   Id. at 783, 791 n.31. 
249.   425 U.S. 748, 749–50 (1976) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54.524.35 (1974)). 
250.  See id. at 760–61. 
251.  See  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824–28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
252.   Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)). 
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because the logic of Virginia Board swept his argument aside.253  If limits 
on corporate speech deprived consumers and voters of vital information, 
disserving their autonomy by denying them the enlightenment they 
needed to make political choices, then any focus on the status of the 
speaker was simply misplaced.254  
C. Austin and the Marketplace of Ideas 
And yet the Court has articulated an alternative vision to Bellotti’s.  
The foundational authority there is Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce.255  That 1990 case concerned a Michigan statute that barred 
corporations from using their treasury funds for speech “in assistance of, 
or in opposition to, the nomination or election of a [political] 
candidate.”256  Corporations, rather, could engage in such speech only 
 
253.   Both sides recognized that the rights of commercial and corporate speakers were 
parallel.  Justice Rehnquist, arguing in a later case that the state could subject corporate 
speakers to compelled speech requirements, relied on commercial speech precedent; he 
explained that in both contexts courts deemed the First Amendment to apply only for the 
sake of informing the public.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 34 
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
254.   Justice Rehnquist’s view of corporate speakers was consistent with his larger 
position that government is only lightly constrained in imposing speech restrictions as a 
condition of the receipt of government benefits.  See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 
468 U.S. 364, 403 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that an educational radio station, 
having accepted public money, cannot avoid the editorializing-ban condition that “Congress 
legitimately attached to receipt of that funding”); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588–90 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991) (approving a 
ban by certain government grantees on “advocat[ing] abortion”); FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 506 (2009) (stating that because the government grants 
broadcasters “free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain,” 
they are subject to “public obligations” constraining their speech (quoting CBS v. FCC, 453 
U.S. 367, 395 (1981))); Sullivan, supra note 92, at 149–50, 159–60.  
 Justice Rehnquist acted consistently with that belief when (without separate opinion) he 
joined the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  See infra 
Part IV.C.  But no other Justice has followed that path.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310, 465 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declining to 
draw First Amendment conclusions from a corporation’s arguable status as “a grantee of a 
state concession”). 
255.   494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
256.  Id. at 655 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.206(1) (1979)).  The statute at issue 
in Austin, like the one in Citizens United (see supra note 189), on its face applied to both for-
profit and nonprofit corporations.  In litigation, the plaintiff—the Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce—emphasized its status as a nonprofit corporation.  As the Court noted, though, 
the nonprofit chamber was populated and funded by for-profit corporations and acted as a 
service bureau for them; unless statutorily restrained, it could “circumvent the Act’s 
restrictions” by acting as a conduit for its members’ spending.  Austin, 494 U.S. at 661–65. 
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using funds generated by voluntary contributions from the corporation’s 
stockholders, officers, and employees.257 
To better understand Austin, we need to look to the history of 
federal election restrictions.  In 1907, Congress banned corporate 
contributions to candidates for federal elective office.258  In 1947, 
Congress enacted a rule forbidding corporate expenditures on speech 
relating to federal elections.259  It tweaked that rule in the 1971 Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA), which allowed corporations to 
establish PACs to engage in such speech; the PACs could not receive 
the corporation’s treasury funds, but they could receive individual 
contributions by stockholders and certain employees.260 
The Court in 1982 approved the federal corporate contribution ban, 
explaining that corporations could exploit “substantial aggregations of 
wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate 
form of organization.”261  It addressed the federal ban on corporate 
expenditures four years later, in 1986.262  
 
257.   See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.255(2)–(3). 
258.   Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907); see also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s 
Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 871 
(2004). 
259.   Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 
(1947). 
260.   Pub. L.  No. 92-225, § 302, 86 Stat. 3, 12–13 (1972). 
261.   FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982).  The case 
involved a challenge to a FECA provision forbidding a corporation to solicit contributions for 
its PAC from persons not adequately connected to it.  Id. at 198–99.  This PAC restriction was 
an adjunct to the larger ban on corporate contributions and expenditures, and made no sense 
without it.  A unanimous Court held that any First Amendment interests of NRWC’s were 
“overborne” by the goals Congress had sought to achieve in the underlying statutory plan: “to 
ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go 
with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war chests’ 
which could be used to incur political debts” and “to protect the individuals who have paid 
money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from 
having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.”  Id. at 
207–08.  Because the NRWC sought to make contributions to political candidates rather than 
expenditures on their behalf, however, the Court had no occasion to address Austin’s 
distortion rationale. 
262.  The Court had already heard two cases involving the statute’s parallel restriction 
on union speech.  In one of those cases, the Court ducked the union’s claim that the 
restriction was unconstitutional as applied to it; the majority, seeing unions and corporations 
as similarly situated, characterized Congress as seeking “to avoid the deleterious influences 
on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large 
aggregations of capital.”  United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); see also 
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415–16 (1972) (Congress 
sought “to eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections.”). 
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In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), the question was 
whether the FECA expenditure limitation could constitutionally be 
applied to nonprofit corporations that were “formed for the express 
purpose of promoting political ideas,” had no shareholders with a claim 
on their assets or earnings, and received no contributions from for-profit 
corporations or unions.263  The Court held that it could not—but none of 
the nine Justices saw a problem with Congress’s larger move to restrict 
corporate speech in response to concerns about “the corrosive influence 
of concentrated corporate wealth.”264  The Court explained that “[d]irect 
corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that 
resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide 
an unfair advantage in the political marketplace”—an advantage that 
was unfair because “[t]he resources in the treasury of a business 
corporation . . . are not an indication of popular support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”265  It continued, however, that the 
exempted category of nonprofits did not pose “the potential for unfair 
deployment of wealth for political purposes” that other corporations 
did.266 
With that background, it was not surprising that the Austin Court in 
1990 upheld Michigan’s statute, which largely paralleled the FECA.267  
The majority began by noting Bellotti’s holding that “[t]he mere fact 
that [plaintiff] is a corporation does not remove its speech from the 
ambit of the First Amendment”;268 it held that the state regulation could 
be justified only with reference to a compelling state interest.269  But the 
Court had no difficulty finding such an interest.270  Corporations, it 
explained, had “legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate 
wealth.”271  They could use those advantages to amass immense 
resources without regard to the extent of any public support for their 
political views.272  And their deployment of that wealth could allow them 
to “unfairly influence elections”—giving them “an unfair advantage in 
 
263.  MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986). 
264.   Id. at 257. 
265.   Id. at 257–58. 
266.   Id. at 259.  The dissenting Justices would have held that the statutory bar could 
constitutionally be applied to all nonprofit corporations.  Id. at 266–67 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
267.  Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990). 
268.   Id. at 657. 
269.   Id. at 658. 
270.   Id. at 660. 
271.  Id. at 665 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258 n.11). 
272.   Id. at 660. 
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the political marketplace,” with “corrosive and distorting effects” 
undermining “the integrity of the political process.”273 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Austin reflects the view—and the 
concern—that success of a message in the marketplace of ideas will turn 
to some extent on the economic resources available to the speaker.274  
From the perspective of anyone other than a First Amendment lawyer, 
that view is unexceptional.  It’s really hard to argue that the political and 
cultural views prevailing in a society are wholly independent of the 
money spent to advance particular ways of looking at the world.275 
To be sure, First Amendment law is built on the view summarized by 
Jerome Barron as the “romantic view of the First Amendment”—that 
more speech is always better, that the “self-correcting force of ‘full and 
free discussion’” will always overcome biases in the marketplace of ideas 
so long as government can be kept from interfering.276  We encountered 
that view in considering the First Amendment context of false 
advertising law.277  But false advertising law recognizes that the 
“romantic view” is in important respect mythology.278  Commentators 
 
273.   Id. at 659–60, 668 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257).  The fact that the Michigan law 
left corporations free to participate in politics using segregated funds, the Court continued, 
demonstrated its narrow tailoring.  Id. at 668–69. 
 Justice Brennan, concurring, took a somewhat different approach: he emphasized the 
value of Michigan’s law in protecting stockholders who did not agree with a corporate 
manager’s decision to use their property to electioneer.  Id. at 673–75 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); see also Winkler, supra note 266, at 874. 
274.   See Austin, 494 U.S at 658–59. 
275.   See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1149–57.  To be sure, that a message is well 
financed does not mean that, in the short-term, it will swing an election or cause the passage 
of legislation; over the history of American politics, many well-financed candidates and ballot 
propositions have failed.  Some of that resistance relates to the strong status quo bias of 
American politics.  See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American 
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 572 (2014).  
Moreover, in candidate elections where both candidates have ample financial support from 
wealthy backers, other factors, such as partisanship and incumbency status, will come to the 
fore.  See Kyle Kondik & Geoffrey Skelley, 14 From ‘14: Quick Takes on the Midterm, U. 
VA. CTR. FOR POL.: SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.centerforpolitics.
org/crystalball/articles/14-from-14-quick-takes-on-the-midterm/ [https://perma.cc/B9UF-VM5
C]; see also Lee Drutman, How Much Did Money Really Matter in 2012?, SUNLIGHT FOUND. 
BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/11/09/how-much-did-
money-matter [https://perma.cc/XMF5-JT8R] (concluding that the connection between 
political spending and electoral victory was weak in 2012 House of Representatives general 
election races).  
276.  Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1641, 1642–43 (1967). 
277.   See supra notes 153–85 and accompanying text. 
278.   See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Barron, supra note 276, at 1647–50; Stanley Ingber, The 
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sometimes defend that mythology as necessary to avoid paternalistic or 
undesirable results,279 or treat the deficiencies of the romantic view as 
“an insight more fundamental than we can use.”280  But law and ideology 
are one thing; social reality is another. 
Recent empirical social science research makes it clear, if more 
proof were needed, that the romantic view of the First Amendment 
incompletely describes the notional marketplace of ideas supporting 
U.S. government elections and decision making.281  That research 
teaches us, for example, that the views of wealthy Americans and 
business-oriented interest groups play a major role in shaping 
government policy, while the views of ordinary Americans—to the 
extent they diverge from those of their wealthier neighbors—appear to 
play no role at all.282  Business interest groups have substantial influence 
on government policy,283 notwithstanding that the correlation between 
                                                                                                                                           
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1; Lidsky, supra note 124; 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1985); Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1148–49; Owen M. Fiss, Comment, State 
Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991). 
279.   See Lidsky, supra note 124; Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual 
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1993). 
280.  That was the way Harry Kalven described Ronald Coase’s challenge to broadcast 
licensing.  Harry Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & 
ECON. 15, 30–32 (1967) (initial capitalization of each word omitted). 
281.   See Gilens & Page, supra note 275, at 571–72. 
282.   See id.  Because the preferences of ordinary Americans overlap substantially with 
those of their wealthier neighbors, the strong connection between wealthy Americans’ 
preferences and government policy choices means that the views of ordinary Americans end 
up being vindicated much of the time.  But on many key issues, those preferences differ.  The 
very wealthy tend to see budget deficits as the most pressing problem facing this country; 
almost no ordinary Americans agree.  The very wealthy, on average, support cutting 
government spending on Social Security and health care; ordinary Americans support 
increasing such spending.  See Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences 
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 56 (2013).  Similarly, ordinary Americans tend 
to favor an expanded government role in making available jobs, health care, and quality 
education to all; the wealthiest Americans do not.  See id. at 57–60. 
283.  Political scientists, to be sure, are not unanimous on this point.  See Beth L. Leech, 
Lobbying and Influence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 
AND INTEREST GROUPS 534, 537 (L. Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry eds., 2010) 
(“[Q]uantitative studies of the influence of lobbying and PACs are . . . contradictory . . . .”).  
That said, “[n]umerous case studies have detailed instances in which all but the most 
dedicated skeptic is likely to perceive interest group influence at work.”  Gilens & Page, supra 
note 275, at 567; see also Leech, supra, at 551.  Conditional interest group power based on 
“alliance making and provision of information” pervades American politics and is 
problematic given that “alliances are forged in part because of abilities to raise campaign 
funds and . . . some interests have a much greater capacity to create and compile 
information.”  Leech, supra, at 551.  On the substantial influence of campaign contributions 
on legislator voting behavior, see DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E.B. STRAUSE, THE NEW 
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the preferences of ordinary Americans and the policy positions of 
business interest groups is negative—that is, policy changes supported 
by ordinary Americans tend to be opposed by business interest groups, 
and vice versa.284 
Nor should that be at all surprising.  After all, American political 
decision making is the product of investments in a variety of speech 
markets.  One such market is lobbying.  Corporate money spent on 
lobbying far exceeds that spent on elections.  Total spending by all 
outside groups285 on federal campaigns in the 2012 election cycle barely 
topped a billion dollars.286  (This sum includes all corporate 
contributions and expenditures, but it also includes a rather larger 
amount of spending paid for by individuals.)287  By contrast, federal 
lobbying expenditures from 2008 through 2013 ranged from $3.24 to 
$3.52 billion dollars.288  It is fair to assume that the overwhelming 
majority of that lobbying was funded by for-profit corporations.  
                                                                                                                                           
SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 71–98 (2014), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/thenewsoftmoney/wp-content/uploads/sites/57/2014/06/the-new-soft-
money-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YSD-D3MD]. 
284.  See Gilens & Page, supra note 275, at 571–72.  This work provides a corrective to 
the oft-expressed earlier view that interest groups, in the aggregate, reflect the views of 
ordinary voters.  Compare ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 335 (1989), 
and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 262–82 (2d ed. 1971) (interest-group competition yields broadly 
majoritarian results), with MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132–67 (1965), and CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, 
POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 261–75 (1977) 
(noting systematic ways in which some interest groups, and particularly business groups, are 
more effective than others). 
285.   By “outside groups,” I mean entities other than the candidates’ own campaigns and 
the Democratic and Republican National Committees.  This includes spending funded by 
either individuals or corporations. 
286.   See Russ Choma, The 2012 Election: Our Price Tag (Finally) for the Whole Ball of 
Wax, OPENSECRETS.ORG: BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/03/t
he-2012-election-our-price-tag-fin/ [https://perma.cc/RHJ8-2XL3]. 
287.  Most outside spending in the 2012 federal election came from Super PACs, and 
only 11% of Super PAC funding in that cycle came from for-profit businesses.  BLAIR BOWIE 
& ADAM LIOZ, DẼMOS, MILLION-DOLLAR MEGAPHONES: SUPER PACS AND UNLIMITED 
OUTSIDE SPENDING IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS 9 (2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/fil
es/publications/MegaphonesMillionaires-DemosUSPIRG.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW5T-KQ2P
].  The law prohibits corporations from contributing to federal candidates or the national 
parties. 
288.   See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG: BLOG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php [https://perma.cc/MYW9-BJKY] (last updated 
Jan. 22, 2106). 
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Certainly all of the biggest spenders on lobbying are for-profit 
corporations or funded by them.289 
And perhaps neither of these is the most important way corporate 
spending affects the public discourse.  Stepping out of the realm of 
politics writ small, consider that still more money (much more) is spent 
on the subject of the first two parts of this Article: commercial 
advertising.290  According to one estimate, total U.S. advertising 
expenditures in 2011 were $144 billion.291  Proctor & Gamble was the 
biggest spender, accounting for about three billion dollars’ worth of 
advertising all by itself.292  And that spending matters.  Americans 
“spend more time exposed to advertising than they spend eating, 
reading, cooking, praying, cleaning and making love combined.”293  
Advertising forms our culture, in the first instance because of the media 
support it provides: broadcast television draws almost all of its revenue 
from advertising, and consumer magazines more than half.294  Media 
executives’ decisions about which audiences to go after, and which 
content to offer those audiences, ultimately rely on advertisers’ 
decisions about which audiences they want to sell to.295 
Advertising helps create, and reflects back to us, a common symbolic 
culture built around the operative values of our economy.  It has been 
 
289.  See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG: BLOG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2013&indexType=s [https://perma.cc/
P89Z-ZKBA] (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).  The biggest spender was the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, spending approximately $74 million in 2013.  The Chamber is formally non-profit 
but is funded entirely by for-profit corporations and engages in speech on its corporate 
members’ behalf, much as the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did in Austin, see supra note 
256. 
290.   The largest U.S. corporations spend, on average, about 2% of their budget on 
commercial ads.  Patricia Laya, Do You Pay Enough for Advertising? One Big Corporation 
Spent a Jaw-Dropping $4.2 Billion Last Year, BUS. INSIDER (June 6, 2011), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/corporations-ad-spending-2011-6?op=1 [https://perma.cc/TH7
E-92BQ]. 
291.   Kantar Media Reports U.S. Advertising Expenditures Increased 0.8 Percent in 2011, 
BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120312005272/e
n/Kantar-Media-Reports-U.S.-Advertising-Expenditures-Increased [https://perma.cc/CE86-
D7LE].  
292.   Id. 
293.   TERRY O’REILLY & MIKE TENNANT, THE AGE OF PERSUASION: HOW 
MARKETING ATE OUR CULTURE, at xiv (2009). 
294.   Joseph Turow & Matthew P. McAllister, Introduction to THINKING CRITICALLY 
ABOUT ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER CULTURE, IN THE ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER 
CULTURE READER 3–4 (Joseph Turow & Matthew P. McAllister eds., 2009). 
295.   See id.; see also C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 66 
(1994). 
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characterized as “the official art of modern capitalist society”296 because, 
just as art presents a context for the larger world, a way of categorizing 
and experiencing the facts of our lives,297 commercial advertising 
provides powerful support for the institutional structures that shape our 
day-to-day existence.298   
Advertising operates on a micro level, sinking billions of dollars 
yearly into promoting, for example, the desirability, sexiness, and value 
of the automobile as a mode of transport, in contexts where competing 
voices can draw on only a minuscule fraction of those economic 
resources.  And it operates on a macro level, emphasizing private 
satisfactions over collective action.  It suggests that each of us can know 
who we are and can achieve respect from others, can solve the problems 
of death and loneliness, simply by buying consumer goods: that 
exchanging money for physical objects will buy us beauty, success, and 
control over our personal circumstances.299 
From this perspective, the Court’s concern in MCFL and Austin 
about “the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth”300 on 
speech markets is unsurprising.  Corporate speech expenditures support 
a business-friendly government structure, and a consumerist and 
market-friendly ideological framework, on a level almost too deep to 
evaluate.  A statute limiting the ability of a corporation to use its 
treasury funds to influence the result of candidate elections does not 
seem an implausible response.  There’s tremendous reason to be 
skeptical, after all, that the cause of truth would be much advanced by a 
corporation’s huge negative ad buy late in an election campaign.301  
 
296.   RAYMOND WILLIAMS, Advertising: The Magic System, in CULTURE AND 
MATERIALISM: SELECTED ESSAYS 173, 184 (2005); see also MICHAEL SCHUDSON, 
ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 
209–33 (1984). 
297.   See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Art as a Cultural System, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: 
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 94 (1983). 
298.   Michael Schudson, pointing to the way committed couples say “I love you” to 
invoke and reaffirm the deep underpinnings of their relationship, concludes: “Advertising is 
capitalism’s way of saying ‘I love you’ to itself.”  SCHUDSON, supra note 296, at 232. 
299.   See id. at 221; WILLIAMS, supra note 296, at 189–90.  
300.   MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986). 
301.   For an anecdote, see Molly Redden, This GOP Regulator Questioned Energy 
Companies—So They Spent Almost $500,000 to Defeat Him, MOTHER JONES (July 15, 2014), 
http://m.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/alabama-energy-election-chip-beeker-terry-dunn 
[https://perma.cc/VQZ6-SF3Q].  Nearly three quarters of the money spent by non-party 
groups in the 2012 congressional elections went to fund attack ads.  TOKAJI & STRAUSE, 
supra note 283, at 40; see also David A. Graham, The Incredible Negative Spending of Super 
PACs—in 1 Chart, ATLANTIC (Oct. 15. 2012), 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/the-incredible-negative-spending-of-super-pacs-
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Even less does it promote democracy for Congress members’ votes to be 
driven by fear of that ad buy—what Norman Ornstein has called “the 
$20 million alien/predator attack on you and your campaign.”302 
D. Bellotti and Austin 
And yet the “distortion” rationale of Austin was badly in tension 
with orthodox First Amendment thinking, and in particular with 
Bellotti.303  The Court in Bellotti had rejected justifications that 
“‘corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out 
other points of view’ or ‘exert an undue influence’ on the electorate”;304 
it had found no reason to believe that “corporate advocacy threatened 
imminently to undermine democratic processes.”305  The Court in 
Bellotti had pointed to Virginia Board in describing restrictions on 
corporate speech as paternalistic.306  “[T]he people in our democracy,” it 
had explained, “are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and 
evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. . . . [I]f there be 
any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and 
arguments advanced by [corporations], it is a danger contemplated by 
the Framers of the First Amendment.”307  That philosophy simply did 
not jibe with the Austin Court’s concern that well-funded corporate 
speech could be regulated as “unfair” or “distorting.”308 
Moreover—as should be clear by now—it was the worldview of 
Bellotti, not Austin, that was more deeply founded in classic First 
Amendment thinking.  Ordinary First Amendment doctrine has at its 
heart the idea that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
                                                                                                                                           
in-1-chart/263643 [https://perma.cc/K3NE-BS92]. 
302.   This American Life: Take the Money and Run for Office (Public Radio 
International radio broadcast Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/461/transcript [http://perma.cc/37JX-8DWT]; see also TOKAJI & STRAUSE, 
supra note 283, at 71, 76–89 (the fear of such attacks is “one of the most important ways 
outside spending affects the legislative process”). 
303.  The narrow holdings of Bellotti and Austin were not inconsistent.  The Bellotti 
majority had explicitly noted the possibility of “a danger of real or apparent corruption in 
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections,” 435 U.S. 765, 788 
n.26 (1978), and no Justice in that case had suggested that restrictions on corporate speech in 
connection with candidate elections would be problematic.  Justice Stevens, concurring in 
Austin, stressed the “vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one 
hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other.”  Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
304.   Austin, 494 U.S at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789). 
305.   Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. 
306.   Id. at 791 n.31. 
307.   Id. at 791–92 (footnotes omitted). 
308.   Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60. 
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trade in ideas—that the best [tool] of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”309  In that 
notional market, we take it for granted that government will enforce 
property rights in communication resources and otherwise support 
private ordering under the common law.  We see that government role 
as both necessary and sufficient to assure a discussion in which members 
of the public have the opportunity to speak and to convince others to 
adopt their views, and listeners process that speech in a sufficiently 
rational manner.310 
I suggested a few pages back that that descriptive understanding of 
how speech works in American society is not especially accurate.311  But 
it is nonetheless central to our First Amendment thought.312  It is at the 
root, for example, of Justice Brandeis’s warning that “[i]f there be time 
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the process of education, the [proper response to subversive 
advocacy] is more speech, not enforced silence.”313  It is exemplified by 
Bellotti’s insistence that we must presume people’s ability to fairly and 
accurately evaluate the “information and arguments” corporations put 
before them.314  And it seems inconsistent with Austin’s concern that 
immense aggregations of corporate wealth, unchecked, could dominate 
the political process.315 
V. CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
How should we understand the Austin Court’s deviation from First 
Amendment orthodoxy?  For that matter, how should we understand 
the apparent anomaly of false advertising law? 
 
309.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
310.   See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1143. 
311.   See supra pp. 599–601. 
312.   This viewpoint is not essential to every set of First Amendment justifications.  See 
Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1141–42.  It nonetheless plays a dominant role in First 
Amendment philosophy taken as a whole.  See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7–12 (1989). 
313.   Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
314.   First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790–92 (1978). 
315.   One might think that the use of a “market for ideas” metaphor might actually 
support government regulation of speech, given our extensive government regulation of the 
market for goods.  See R.H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for 
Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974); see also Aaron Director, The 
Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1964).  But mainstream First 
Amendment philosophy has never gone down that path. 
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Duncan Kennedy and others, forty years ago, suggested that much 
of law reflects an opposition between two broad worldviews.316  The first 
sees individuals in society as free and autonomous (in all but exceptional 
cases); it is rooted in individualism, value subjectivity, a sharp public–
private distinction, and nonpaternalism.317  In doctrinal form, it is often 
expressed through rules.318 
The other, by contrast, treats some degree of dependence and 
constraint as pervasively present in private ordering.319  It is grounded in 
altruism and a belief in the communal nature of values; it minimizes the 
public–private distinction and makes room for paternalism.320  In 
doctrinal form, it is expressed in important part through situationally 
sensitive standards and balancing.321 
Imagine contract law as an example.  Contract law might follow 
mainstream freedom of speech philosophy by treating private choices in 
the market place as completely autonomous and free.  It would 
therefore seek to vindicate private choices by enforcing all contracts that 
are supported by formal consideration; it would treat duress, fraud, and 
unconscionability as arising only in exceptional cases, relevant only in 
sharply bounded, supplementary doctrinal areas.322 
On the other hand, contract law might adopt the view that elements 
of fraud or economic constraint are pervasive, present in greater or 
lesser degree in the circumstances leading up to every contract.  It might 
seek to address those concerns through doctrine-invalidating contracts 
whenever the parties seem to have had problematically unequal 
bargaining power, or where the contracts simply seem too unfair.323  To 
do so, it would have to rely on some form of fact-specific inquiry, asking 
“whether one’s trading partners can actually take care of themselves” 
instead of “presum[ing] that their formal legal capacity is the same as 
actual capacity.”324  That approach wouldn’t treat private contracts as 
something presumptively to be shielded from public intrusion; it would 
 
316.  See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
317.   See id. at 1767–71. 
318.   See id. at 1770. 
319.   See id. at 1771–74. 
320.   See id. 
321.   See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 290–95 (1987); 
Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1167. 
322.   Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1168–73. 
323.  Id. at 1172–73. 
324.   KELMAN, supra note 321, at 60. 
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recognize that existing property entitlements are government 
conferred.325 
Some scholars have suggested that the two approaches coexist in 
American law notwithstanding their fundamental contradiction and that 
the former tends to play the dominant role;326 for purposes of this 
Article, we might call the first approach the “default” framework.  
Certainly that seems to hold true for First Amendment law.  The default 
framework nicely fits Bellotti and mainstream First Amendment 
thought.  Bellotti adopts the default position’s assumption of a world of 
individual autonomy, in which individuals can participate as individuals 
in the marketplace of ideas, self-directedly able to speak and convince 
others of their views, unaffected by the skewing or coercive effects of 
inequalities of wealth and power in the private sphere.  It follows the 
default position in its assumption that people react to speech in rational 
ways, choosing to adopt one belief rather than another as part of a 
willed, chosen reasoning process; it rejects the idea that people’s views 
are largely determined by socialization, social position, etc.327  It follows 
the default position in its understanding that the only meaningful source 
of constraint in the marketplace of ideas is government intervention.328 
But the alternative position—rooted in the concern that inequality 
of private power and resources undermines citizens’ free interaction—
holds sway to some extent in American law as well.  As I once wrote 
elsewhere, “[w]e premise much of the modern administrative state on 
the recognition that the economic sphere is in important degree marked 
by domination and constraint, that government refusal to intervene is 
not necessarily empowering.”329  We give a variety of administrative 
agencies, such as the FTC, discretion to address that (although lawyers 
tend to see it as a problem that administrators exercise discretion rather 
than applying hard-edged rules).330 
And the alternative position holds sway in some areas of First 
Amendment law: I have suggested elsewhere that U.S. broadcast 
 
325.   Those, after all, were among the realists’ key insights.  See John P. Dawson, 
Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 277 (1947); Robert L. 
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); see also 
Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 764 (1981) (book 
review). 
326.  See KELMAN, supra note 321, at 290–95; Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1181. 
327.   See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791–92. 
328.   See id. at 776–86. 
329.   Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1179. 
330.   See id. at 1178–79. 
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regulation law, in major part, reflects the alternative approach.331  That’s 
what underlay the Court’s caution in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 
that absent administrative allocation, a few private licensees might 
“monopoliz[e]” broadcast discourse, making impossible an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.332  It’s what underlay the fear that absent a 
fairness doctrine, private holders of media power would be able to 
exercise “unlimited private censorship.”333 
Austin’s concern that inequality of private power and resources may 
undermine citizens’ free interaction straightforwardly embraces the 
alternative position peeking out from below the surface of our 
jurisprudence.334  The law of commercial speech reflects the same 
dichotomy. 
In other words, commercial speech law, like our corporate speech 
precedent, is riven.  Both bodies of law display the same themes of 
autonomy and constraint, the same split between default and alternative 
positions.  Recall that the Court’s rationales in Bellotti and Virginia 
Board were essentially the same: In thinking about both commercial 
advertising and corporate speech, the Court told us that the speech is 
protected not for the sake of the self-actualization or the freedom of 
conscience of those who utter it but because it provides valuable views 
and information to listeners.335  The Court in Sorrell relied on that 
thinking to rule that content discrimination in the regulation of 
commercial speech is sharply disfavored, as much so as in the political-
speech context.336 
But in commercial speech law as in the law of corporate speech, the 
vision of information made available by corporations to all is countered 
by competing concerns about exploitation and distortion.  When it came 
to electoral speech by corporations, Austin provided the counterpoint; 
in the law of commercial speech, consumer protection and trademark 
law provide the analogous exceptions. 
Mainstream First Amendment law’s sharp rhetoric forbidding 
paternalism and content discrimination thus falls away once commercial 
speech is said to be “misleading”; the law of misleading advertising 
straightforwardly reflects the premises of the alternative position.  
 
331.   See id. at 1181–89. 
332.   395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
333.   Id. at 392. 
334.   See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S 652, 658–60 (1990). 
335.  First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
336.   Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664–67 (2011). 
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Rejecting the myth of the supremely competent auditor, it recognizes 
that consumers process speech in ways that may lend themselves to 
exploitation by advertisers hoping to mislead and that greater or lesser 
degrees of distortion and nonrational thinking are pervasive in the 
enterprise of advertising.  It adopts a stance of paternalism, protecting 
consumers from their own errors.  And in order to do so, it relies not on 
fact-specific, case-by-case determinations, not on the sort of hard-edged 
rules that maximize predictability for speakers.  In other words, just as 
the philosophy of Bellotti is opposed by the concerns of Austin, the 
libertarian philosophy of Sorrell is opposed by our acceptance of an 
expansive and paternalistic government role when it comes to 
misleading advertising. 
Recognizing this dichotomy helps us understand some key points.  
First, the fact that Austin’s worldview is necessarily in tension with the 
one underlying Bellotti does not mean that either one is wrong.  To the 
contrary, both are fundamental (if inconsistent) building blocks of U.S. 
law, reflecting deeply held intuitions, and both reflect aspects of reality. 
Second, I will suggest, the occasional emergence of the alternative 
position in American law is what makes dominance of the default 
position tolerable.  On the one hand, it’s a good thing that the default 
position is dominant in First Amendment law.  The default position is 
properly concerned about self-interested government control of 
individuals’ speech.  Curbing private power over speech resources 
means enhancing public authority, and that means giving government 
officials supervisory authority over a segment of public debate.  Any 
vision of a more active governmental role in supervising the speech 
marketplace has to deal with the significant chance that government 
action will be incompetent, misguided, arbitrary, or political.337 
But the example of consumer protection law suggests that we 
cannot, as a practical matter, stick only with the default position.  A 
speech regulatory system based only on classic free-speech philosophy 
underestimates the degree to which concentrations of private power can 
skew the reasoning processes of the community.  Common experience 
tells us that government regulation of misleading advertising is good for 
society.  Trademark law, as broadly understood today, is good for 
society.  If ordinary First Amendment thinking tells us otherwise, that’s 
an indication that ordinary First Amendment thinking is incomplete.  A 
complete, and workable, system of free expression will have niches in 
 
337.  See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1195. 
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which it will acknowledge the alternative position, and will regulate 
accordingly.  
VI. CORPORATE SPEECH REDUX 
There is one obvious difference between the law of corporate speech 
and the law of commercial advertising.  In the former—but not the 
latter—the Supreme Court recently has acted to eliminate the internal 
conflict between default and alternative positions.  In Citizens United in 
2011, the Court characterized Bellotti and Austin as “conflicting lines of 
precedent,”338 and embraced the first to overrule the second.339  It 
rejected the possibility that corporate expenditures could distort or 
corrupt at all.340  Quite the contrary, the majority said: it is vital to our 
society that corporate voices, which “best represent the most significant 
segments of the economy,” be able to “reach[] the public and advis[e] 
voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”341  
When government limits corporations’ ability to speak, out of fear that 
massive corporate treasuries will distort the marketplace of ideas, it is 
really “control[ling] thought” and eliminating “the freedom to think for 
ourselves.”342 
The Court built on that foundation in 2014 in deciding McCutcheon 
v. FEC.343  That case involved individual rather than corporate 
contributions.344  Federal law limited the total amount an individual 
could donate in a given election cycle; it sought to address the danger 
that large contributors to a party and its candidates would gain undue 
influence over the party’s office holders, an influence the statute’s 
drafters had seen as “inherently, endemically, and hopelessly 
corrupting.”345  But just as the Court in Citizens United rejected the 
possibility that corporate speech could be distorting or corrupting, in 
McCutcheon it rejected the idea that—absent literal bribery—it was 
distorting or corrupting for large contributors to a party to have unusual 
 
338.   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346–48 (2010). 
339.   Id. at 365. 
340.   Id. at 348–49. 
341.   Id. at 354 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
342.   Id. at 356. 
343.   134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
344.   Id. at 1443. 
345.   McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 481 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Senator 
Rudman), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), quoted in McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 
at 1484 (Appendix A). 
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influence over elected officials from that party.346  Quite the contrary—
special influence for those with the means to make large financial 
contributions, Chief Justice Roberts explained, is a “central feature of 
democracy.”347 
Now, that a Supreme Court majority would exalt disproportionate 
political access for the wealthy as a “central feature of democracy”348 
was not an obvious result.  Nor had it been a foregone conclusion that 
the Court in Citizens United would sweep away a six-decade-old, 
repeatedly reaffirmed, federal statutory regime.349  Both decisions were 
5–4, after all,350 and by a margin of one vote could have gone the other 
way.  But the Citizens United result teaches us that Austin’s position in 
the law of corporate speech was fragile in a way that commercial-speech 
consumer protection law is not. 
A. Speech and Citizenship 
Why was that?  Let’s go back to Austin, and look more closely.  
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, in their separate Austin dissents, stressed 
what they saw as a fatal contradiction between Austin’s rule and the 
structure of ordinary First Amendment law.351  They pointed out that in 
ordinary freedom of speech law, we don’t normally see inequalities in 
speech resources as problematic.352  We assume that the marketplace of 
 
346.   McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1451 (plurality opinion). 
347.   The full quote, in case the reader figures that the language quoted in text must 
have been taken out of context, states: 
[G]overnment regulation [of campaign contributions] may not target the general 
gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the 
political access such support may afford.  “Ingratiation and access . . . are not 
corruption.”  They embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents 
support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are 
elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns. 
Id. at 1441 (omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 360 (2010)). 
 As Usha Rodrigues has shown, the price for an official act inspired by a campaign 
contribution can be surprisingly low.  See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption 4 
(Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series No. 2014-23 Aug. 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486720 [http://perma.cc/35R2-67NU]. 
348.  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion). 
349.   The Court had reaffirmed Austin’s validity as recently as 2003.  See McConnell, 540 
U.S. 93; see also FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).  
350.   See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434. 
351.  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S 652, 679–80 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); id. at 695–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
352.   Id. at 680–85, 692–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 704–06 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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ideas is not disabled by the fact that some individuals can devote vastly 
more resources to speech than others.353  Indeed, the fact that different 
individuals are able to spend completely arbitrary amounts of money on 
speech, depending on the resources available to them, is at the heart of 
the American system of freedom of speech.354 
First Amendment law has never acknowledged anything wrong with 
that inequality.  On the contrary, our cases say that government is 
largely disabled from addressing it.355  “[T]he concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”356  Any such step, we are told, would constitute 
prohibited discrimination against the speech of the wealthy.357  As the 
Court has put this argument, perhaps channeling Anatole France, the 
First Amendment right to speak cannot “be made to depend on a 
person’s financial ability.”358 
Michigan campaign finance law, thus, imposed no limitations on the 
ability of wealthy individuals to spend their own money on speech 
relating to candidate elections:359 if a wealthy individual had wanted to 
drop $50 or $60 billion on public information campaigns relating to the 
Michigan gubernatorial election, Michigan law saw no reason to stop 
him.  Moreover, all of the Justices would have agreed, the First 
Amendment stripped from Michigan any power to stop him.360 
In light of all that, Justices Scalia and Kennedy can be seen to argue, 
the Austin majority’s embrace of the alternative position was simply 
incoherent: it created a contradiction in campaign finance law that was 
too powerful to ignore.361  While a corporation accumulates funds 
without regard “to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
 
353.   See supra Part IV.C. 
354.   See supra Part IV.C. 
355.   See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (federal law cannot raise 
contribution limits for opponents of candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own 
money); see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 
2828–29 (2011) (stating that the state cannot administer matching funds system so as to award 
publicly financed candidates the same amount of money spent by or on behalf of their 
privately financed opponents). 
356.   Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam). 
357.   Id. at 49 n.55. 
358.   Id. at 49; cf. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (New York, The Modern 
Library 1917) (1894) (“[T]he majestic equality of the laws . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to 
sleep under the bridges . . . .”). 
359.   See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665 (1990). 
360.   See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45. 
361.   See Austin, 494 U.S at 665; id. at 682–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ideas,”362 the same is true of wealthy individuals who choose to buy 
political advertising.  Yet if the distortion is the same whether the 
money is coming from Koch Industries or the Koch brothers, what 
difference does it make?  After all, as the Citizens United majority later 
urged, all speakers, whether corporate or individual, “use money 
amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.”363 
The Austin majority answered that corporations—unlike 
individuals—amass their funds by virtue of a “unique state-conferred 
corporate structure.”364  That answer, though, just isn’t satisfying.  It 
leaves open the question why, exactly, the state-conferred structure 
should matter.  Is a corporation’s speech, using funds accumulated with 
the aid of state corporations law, more distorting than the speech of a 
wealthy individual, using funds accumulated with the aid of state 
property, contracts, and estates law?  After all, nonprofit corporations 
also utilize the state-conferred corporate structure, and Justice Marshall 
had joined Justice Brennan’s opinion in MCFL holding that concerns 
about “the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth” don’t 
necessarily apply to nonprofits.365 
 
362.   Id. at 660 (majority opinion). 
363.   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010). 
364.  Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
365.   FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); see also supra notes 274–
75 and accompanying text. 
 One important consequence of the corporate structure is that for-profit corporate 
managers are using what has notably been described as “other people’s money”—they are 
engaging in speech using funds contributed by shareholders, who haven’t authorized the 
corporation to spend the money in this way.  See Winkler, supra note 258, at 873–74.  I think, 
though, that this argument has less independent force than initially appears.  The argument 
offers no basis to challenge corporate managers’ decisions to spend money on advertising or 
other speech closely aligned with the core interests of the corporation; we take it for granted 
that a corporation can spend money to advance its business interests.  That speech has a 
profound cultural impact that is on some level equally unintended by the folks whose salary 
contributions funded the pension funds that are buying corporate shares.  And why, then, is a 
corporation’s political speech not equally unproblematic so long as the corporation is 
sufficiently clear-eyed about which political outcomes will maximize its profits?  Corporate 
political speech is commonly intended to advance the firm’s business interests, as when the 
corporation seeks to defeat an officeholder whom it believes will be sympathetic to 
undesirable regulation.  All of this poses, at the very least, a line-drawing challenge to the 
claim that certain corporate speech unfairly relies on the contributions of dissenting 
stockholders. 
 Moreover, if we assume that corporate political spending is a frolic undertaken by 
managers divergent from the interests of corporate shareholders, see First Nat’l Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 813 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (characterizing the challenged 
corporate speech expenditures in that case as “promot[ing] . . . the purely personal views of 
the management”), can we reconcile that with the alternative argument, see infra notes 400–
02 and accompanying text, that corporate speech is undeserving of First Amendment 
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Are there other ways to minimize or mitigate this contradiction?  
One possible answer might be that the state-conferred structure allows 
for-profit corporations to amass “immense aggregations of wealth” that 
can “dominat[e] the political process”366 in a way that a few wealthy 
individuals cannot.  That corporations have more and bigger 
aggregations of wealth than individuals is undeniable; more than fifty 
U.S. corporations have market capitalization larger than the net worth 
of Bill Gates (the richest U.S. individual).367  It’s an empirical question, 
though, whether individuals or corporations, in the aggregate, are more 
motivated to spend their money on influencing candidate elections.  So 
far the answer seems to be the former.  In the 2012 federal election 
cycle, the total of the identifiable contributions made by all for-profit 
businesses to Super PACs was not quite as much as the contributions of 
one couple—Sheldon and Miriam Adelson—individually.368 
Alternatively, one might argue that while wealthy individuals may 
individually have outsize influence, collectively their views tend to 
cancel each other out, lessening their systemic effect on the marketplace 
of ideas.369  By contrast, one might argue, for-profit corporations’ unfair 
influence tends to push in a single direction, structurally biased towards 
capitalism, consumerism, and anti-regulation (except where regulation 
generates rents), thus tending to skew and distort the conversation.370  
Like the alternative position generally, this argument has the advantage 
of being rooted in reality.  It will not avail us, though, if we’re looking 
for consistency with mainstream First Amendment law.  This argument 
seems grotesquely un-First-Amendment-y to anyone who learned about 
viewpoint discrimination in the basic Constitutional Law course.  And 
there is still the counterargument that allowing viewpoint-based 
government regulation of speech on this theory would be even more 
dangerous than letting capital have its say. 
                                                                                                                                           
protection because it is entirely market determined?  And would any of this be a problem but 
for our concern that this expenditure of other peoples’ money will skew the marketplace of 
ideas?  In that sense, I think the “other people’s money” argument collapses into Austin’s 
distortion claim. 
366.   Austin, 494 U.S at 659–60. 
367.   Compare The Forbes 400, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/forbes-
400/ [http://perma.cc/KK4E-43GZ] (as of September 29, 2015, Bill Gates was the wealthiest 
American with a net worth of $76 billion), with Fin. Times, Financial Times Global 500 (Mar. 
31, 2014), http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/7097ad1a-fded-11e3-bd0e-00144feab7de.xls 
[https://perma.cc/6HLB-6T6U]. 
368.   See BOWIE & LIOZ, supra note 287, at 1. 
369.   See id. at 12–13 (urging that this argument is empirically unsupported). 
370.   See supra Part IV.C. 
 2016] ON COMMERCIAL—AND CORPORATE—SPEECH 615 
Finally, one might answer that for-profit corporations are unlike 
wealthy individuals in that they fall outside of our political community.  
By definition, one might argue, speech of wealthy individuals reflects 
“popular support”371 because wealthy individuals are, after all, people.  
By contrast, corporations are not part of the polity; they are exterior to 
our circle of citizenship.  Thus, the argument continues, law allowing 
corporations to amass great wealth and then to use that wealth to 
influence candidate elections is law allowing outside forces to influence 
our community, working corrosion and distortion of the community’s 
discourse. 
This claim is worth further exploration because we have so little 
difficulty with it in a more straightforward context.  Consider the 
controversy over foreign spending in U.S. candidate elections that arose 
in the wake of Citizens United.  Politicians and others raised the 
possibility that Citizens United could open the door to foreigners’ 
seeking to influence U.S. elections—and while opinion may have been 
divided on the desirability of corporate spending, hardly anybody 
seemed to think foreign spending was a good idea.372 
Let’s do a thought experiment: Imagine that the American people 
learn that a deep-pocketed foreign actor is planning on spending a huge 
amount of money in order to influence U.S. candidate elections.  One 
can imagine people having two possible reactions.  The first possibility: 
“This is wonderful news.  The money will fund additional advertising 
and other forms of speech so that the marketplace of ideas will be richer 
and U.S. citizens will be better informed.  There is no downside.”  The 
 
371.   Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479, U.S. 238, 258 (1986)). 
372.   See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 424 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (majority’s approach “would appear to afford the same 
protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual 
Americans”); President Barrack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address [https://pe
rma.cc/D729-SNNF] (“[Citizens United] will open the floodgates for special interests—
including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”); Dan Eggen & Ben 
Pershing, Campaign Finance Ruling Leaves Democrats with Few Options, WASH. POST (Jan. 
23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/22/AR20100122048
11.html [https://perma.cc/3NET-NJMA] (quoting Democratic Rep. Chris Van Hollen as 
asking: “Do you really want the Chinese or any other country to be able to spend money on 
our elections?”); see also John Hudson, Feds: Mexican Tycoon Exploited Super PACs to 
Influence U.S. Elections, FP: CABLE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/11/feds-
mexican-tycoon-exploited-super-pacs-to-influence-u-s-elections/ [https://perma.cc/NY47-
8JQN].  But see Brief of Amici Curiae the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee 
Rights and the National Immigrant Justice Center in Support of Appellants, Bluman v. FEC, 
132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (No. 11-275), http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/bluman_sc_icirr_nijc_am
icus_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QTL-DTZY]. 
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second: “This is problematic, because the outcome of the election will 
be shifted in the direction desired by some entity not part of the U.S. 
political community, with interests perhaps adverse to that of the 
community as a whole.”  The logic of Citizens United suggests the first 
reaction,373 but the intuitive reaction of most people would be the 
second.  And indeed, it’s the second position that’s reflected in U.S. 
law.374 
United States statutory law forbids any person who is not a U.S. 
citizen (or a lawful permanent resident while in the United States) to 
spend money to make “electioneering communications”375—that is, 
those messages advocating the election or defeat of a political candidate, 
disseminated via broadcast, cable, or satellite immediately before an 
election, that the Citizens United Court held were within the sphere of 
protected corporate speech.376  The courts have upheld the restriction; 
the U.S. government, we are told, has a compelling interest in “limiting 
the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic 
self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the 
U.S. political process.”377 
That holding—by a three-judge district court in Bluman v. FEC378 
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court379—rests on two, perhaps 
three, foundations.  The first is that well-targeted expenditures on 
speech can indeed affect public debate in ways inconsistent with the 
marketplace metaphor—otherwise, concern about foreign influence 
would make no sense.380  The second is a refusal to credit the view that 
“more speech is always better” when the additional speech originates 
from sources outside “the community’s process of political self-
definition.”381  The third, perhaps, is a premise that speech and 
expenditures closely tied to candidate elections can be more easily 
regulated than speech in general.382 
 
373.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
374.  52 U.S.C. § 30121 (Supp. 2015) (previously classified as 2 U.S.C. § 441(e)). 
375.   Id. 
376.   See supra pp. 586–87. 
377.   Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge panel), aff’d 
mem., 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). 
378.   Id. 
379.   Bluman, 132 S. Ct. 1087. 
380.   See Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288–90. 
381.   See id. at 287 (quoting Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982)). 
382.   See id. at 290–92. 
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Could this reasoning apply to corporations’ political speech?  The 
Bluman court, anticipating the question, said no.383  “American 
corporations,” it explained, “are all members of the American political 
community.”384  And that is the issue, if the Austin concern for corporate 
distortion is not to pose a recalcitrant contradiction with other elements 
of First Amendment law.  Do we see for-profit corporations as Austin 
sees them, as artificial legal entities that sit atop immense aggregations 
of wealth, but whose political ideas are uncorrelated with those of “the 
public”?385  Or do we see them as Citizens United sees them, as 
“associations of citizens”386 that “represent the most significant segments 
of the economy”?387  Opposed to Justice Stevens’ insistence that 
corporations “are not themselves members of ‘We the People’”388 we 
have Justice Roberts’s recognition of the commonplace that 
“[c]orporate executives and employees counsel Members of Congress 
and Presidential administrations on many issues, as a matter of 
routine.”389 
Part of the challenge here is that the lines of the human discursive 
and political community do not neatly track the rules of corporate 
organization.  Towards the beginning of Part IV, I suggested a 
distinction between closely held corporations (defined by the IRS to 
include those where a majority of the stock is held by five or fewer 
people)390 and publicly held corporations marked by a greater 
separation of ownership and control.391  A small for-profit corporation 
(say, a law firm) might look a lot like a true ideological association.392  
 
383.   Id. at 290. 
384.   Id. 
385.  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
386.   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).  
387.   Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)). 
388.   Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
389.   Id. at 355 (majority opinion).  This brings back to mind the question I had earlier 
dismissed as not useful: whether we should think of corporations as “persons.”  See supra Part 
IV.A. 
390.   More accurately, the category of corporations described in text includes both 
“closely held” corporations and “personal service” corporations, for which the corporation’s 
principal activity is providing personal services in specified fields, and where a substantial part 
of the services are provided by employee-owners.  See IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 
542, CORPORATIONS 2–3 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p542.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5HQG-42TA]. 
391.   See supra pp. 586–89. 
392.   This is all the more true for “benefit corporations,” for-profit entities organized in 
part to serve public-interest goals.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (2016). 
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Its speech might well be appropriately seen as analogous to the 
associational speech of nonprofit corporations formed and funded by 
individuals.  But the distinction is imperfect.  The category of closely 
held corporations includes some—like food, agriculture, financial, and 
industrial products and services provider Cargill, with more than $120 
billion in revenue and 153,000 employees393—which more nearly seem to 
present the problems Austin raised.394  Nor does the distinction between 
individuals, closely held corporations, and other corporations exhaust 
the possibilities for categorization—where, under this approach, would 
one slot LLCs, say, or limited partnerships? 
Alternatively, even large for-profit corporations can sometimes look 
at least a little like human ideological communities.  Google is a large 
for-profit corporation, but its public policy positions—such as its 
opposition to the SOPA bill395—plausibly reflect the views of many 
Google employees.  And while some have suggested that corporations’ 
speech lies outside our human discourse because it is instrumental and 
market determined,396 human individuals too (sometimes) speak 
instrumentally and in the cause of profit.  So the lines are hard to draw.  
And that makes sense: as I indicated in Part V, once legal decision-
makers begin treating limitations on individual autonomy as pervasive 
rather than exceptional, then hard-edged rules become problematic.  
One needs to turn to fuzzier, situationally sensitive standards.397 
B. The Limits of Austin 
There is a different reason, moreover, to view Austin as fragile.  
Recall that notwithstanding the challenges detailed in the previous 
section, the principles of Austin were the law for sixty-four years.398  And 
yet Austin never had any applicability outside the narrow context of 
 
393.   America’s Best Employer’s #133 Cargill, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/companies/cargill/ [http://perma.cc/ZE7U-WVAW] (last visited Apr. 
1, 2016). 
394.   See Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Ruling Raises Question: What Does 
‘Closely Held’ Mean?, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2014, at A6, http://online.wsj.com/articles/hobby-
lobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-closely-held-mean-1404154577 [https://perma.cc/6FKM
-RRKS]. 
395.   See David Drummond, Don’t Censor the Web, GOOGLE: PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 
18, 2012), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2012/01/dont-censor-web.html 
[https://perma.cc/J7QQ-54M6]. 
396.   See Baker, supra note 232, at 1177. 
397.   See Weinberg, supra note 119, at 1175. 
398.   I am counting from the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 to Citizens 
United.  See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
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candidate elections.399  Why?  The answer: Austin was workable only 
when confined to that narrow corner. 
It is not that one cannot imagine extending Austin more broadly.  
The late Ed Baker, using reasoning parallel to that later found in 
Bluman, argued that commercial speech, and the speech of for-profit 
corporations, should enjoy no First Amendment protection at all.400  
Corporate speech, he argued, does not stem from a human discursive 
community.401  It is driven by market needs rather than by individuals’ 
feelings or desires.402  Our political community is limited to natural 
persons, he continued, and we as a people can choose to keep the 
conversation within our own community.403  But a little thought makes 
clear the deep problems inherent in seeking to extend the approach of 
Austin to the world of speech at large. 
Recall Bellotti’s starting point, that it is imperative to protect 
corporations’ speech because that speech provides information that 
educates the public and informs the political process.404  That argument 
is uncontroversial when it comes to the mass media; even folks who are 
most concerned about corporate skew wouldn’t want to strip First 
Amendment protections from the institutional press.405  But a lot of 
entities that perform mass media functions are owned by corporations.406  
So can we, following Austin, adequately distinguish between (good) 
corporate media, protected because of their informing role, from other 
(bad) corporate entities, entitled to less protection because of the 
dangers of distortion? 
The exercise I’m proposing here is a simple line-drawing exercise—
but I want to emphasize how problematic that line drawing would be.  
The Supreme Court, over the years, has uncontroversially recognized 
free speech rights in a wide range of media corporations broadly 
construed—newspapers and broadcasters407 but also movie 
distributors,408 theatrical producers,409 book publishers,410 even bars that 
 
399.  See Richard H. Pildes, Elections as a Distinct Sphere Under the First Amendment, in 
MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 19 (Monica Youn 
ed., 2011). 
400.   See Baker, supra note 232, at 1187. 
401.   See id. at 1182–83. 
402.  See id. at 1177. 
403.   See id. at 1183. 
404.   See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1977); see also supra Part IV. 
405.   See id. at 808 & n.8 (White, J., dissenting). 
406.   See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964). 
407.   See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
408.   See, e.g., Kingley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690 
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feature live entertainment.411  Federal campaign finance law, pre-
Citizens United, addressed this via a statutory exemption intended to 
protect “the unfettered right of the newspapers, TV networks, and other 
media to cover and comment on political campaigns.”412  But outside the 
realm of candidate elections, where would we draw the line to define 
those corporate entities whose speech advances First Amendment goals 
in a way outweighing any dangers of distortion? 
Some have suggested that we can solve this problem simply by 
protecting the “press.”413  But it would not do to protect only entities 
engaged in news gathering.414  That would leave corporate-owned movie 
studios, theatrical producers, and entertainment venues without First 
Amendment protection, and few would think that a good result. 
One might imagine, again drawing on intuitive understandings of the 
“press,” that corporate entities should gain First Amendment protection 
only when disseminating speech to the public as an end rather than a 
means.  The idea would be to distinguish the public relations firm, 
seeking to manage the news, from a newspaper seeking to report it.415  
But that doesn’t give us a coherent or workable test; members of the 
press typically disseminate speech as a means to the end of selling ads 
                                                                                                                                           
(1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952). 
409.   See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1975). 
410.   See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 123 (1991). 
411.   See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932–34 (1975). 
412.   H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 4 (1974). 
413.   See E-mail from Roslyn Litman to the author (Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with author). 
414.   The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), thus, defines the “news media” 
to include entities that gather information “about current events or that would be of current 
interest to the public,” “turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distribute[] that work 
to an audience.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012); see also Cause of Action v. FTC, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 142, 161–64 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating that an organization is not news media for FOIA 
purposes unless it can “disseminate the requested information to the public rather than 
merely make it available” and “its operational activities are especially organized around 
doing so”).  State shield laws undertake the same sort of inquiry.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:84A-21a (2011) (defining “news media” to include “newspapers, magazines, press 
associations, news agencies, [and] wire services,” with each of those terms separately defined, 
as well as radio, television, and “other similar printed, photographic, mechanical or electronic 
means of disseminating news to the general public”).  That statute at one point circularly 
defines “news” to include any information disseminated by news media, id. § 2A:84A-21a(b), 
but the definitions elsewhere treat it as having independent meaning, see, e.g., id. § 2A:84A-
21a(c) (defining “newspaper” as “a paper that is printed and distributed ordinarily not less 
frequently than once a week and that contains news, articles of opinion, editorials, features, 
advertising, or other matter regarded as of current interest, has a paid circulation and has 
been entered at a United States post office as second class matter”). 
415.  See In re Napp Tech. Litig., 768 A.2d 274, 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) 
(denying state shield law protection to a public relations firm on essentially this ground). 
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and making money.416  One might argue that an entity should enjoy 
protection as “press” if it controls its own means of distribution, as 
newspapers and magazines do, rather than merely soliciting or 
purchasing from others a route to the public’s eyeballs.  But Internet-
mediated communication makes a hash of that approach: any entity can 
put up a website directly accessible to the public.417 
One might say that a for-profit corporate entity is “the press” and 
entitled to protection if and only if it is engaged in the business of selling 
speech to the public for money.  This would include the New York 
Times, and exclude political advertising, including the speech centrally 
at issue in the Citizens United case (a video called Hillary: The Movie 
that the maker sought to make available, via cable-system video-on-
demand, at no charge to viewers).418  The idea would be that media 
corporations distribute speech the public wants and is willing to pay for, 
while speech that a corporation distributes without market constraint 
should be seen as just an attempt to manipulate the discourse. 
Unsurprisingly, that still doesn’t work.  If Hillary: The Movie had 
been offered for a peppercorn, should its status then have been 
different?  And what about NBC News, which is available for free to 
anyone with a broadcast antenna?  The Washington Times, a nominally 
for-profit entity that has lost money every year it has been in 
existence?419  The owners of the Washington Times, in a very real sense, 
have paid to distribute its speech to the public; but characterizing it on 
that basis as not “the press” would be odd.  A little earlier, I mentioned 
the claim that corporations’ speech should be deemed to lie outside our 
human discourse because it is instrumental and market determined;420 
this approach seems to say, contradictorily, that speech is market 
determined only if it is not sold in the marketplace. 
 
416.   Nor would it work to make frequency of publication the test.  See, e.g., In re 
Burnett, 635 A.2d 1019, 1020–21, 1024 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1993) (holding that a once-a-
year report rating the financial condition of insurance companies was “news media” within 
the meaning of New Jersey’s shield law).  
417.   Cause of Action v. FTC, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 163, suggested that whether an 
organization with a website was “news media” for FOIA purposes should depend on how 
popular the website is.  While this might work for FOIA purposes, it seems deeply 
problematic from a First Amendment perspective. 
418.   The maker proposed to pay $1.2 million for the use of those facilities.  Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). 
419.   Jennifer Harper, Washington Times Reaches Profitability After 33 Years, $1 Billion 
in Losses, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/14/
washington-times-reaches-profitability-after-33-ye/print/ [https://perma.cc/UQ92-8M3X]. 
420.   See supra note 396 and accompanying text.  
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One might say that the corporate speech deserving fullest protection 
is speech that in some meaningful sense is really the speech of the 
human beings who created it—notwithstanding that those individuals 
were working within, or connected via contracts to, a corporate entity.  
That approach would give more First Amendment protection to a book 
written by J.K. Rowling and published by Little Brown than to an essay 
on corporate responsibility published with no individual by-line by GM; 
the idea would be that the former was more nearly an expression of 
individual authorship. 
Yet there are individuals behind GM’s speech as much as there are 
individuals behind a publisher’s books.  Some Don Draper writes those 
messages from GM—whether commercial or political—and he utilizes 
creativity and artistry in doing so.  The argument would have to be that 
Don’s human authorship on behalf of GM doesn’t count because he is 
only acting within an economically determined role.  But then how do 
we treat the corporation-owned bar that plays live music?  The bar 
musician is also acting within an economically determined role. 
Should our criterion then be whether the individual speaker (whose 
speech is being coordinated or distributed by the corporation) has 
meaningful autonomy about what messages she sends?  It does not seem 
at all satisfying to say that when a corporation owns a restaurant, and 
hires a musician, then whether the First Amendment applies depends on 
how closely it restricts her set list.  Nor can we say that it’s not “media” 
if a corporation is coordinating or distributing speech only in service of 
its own economic interests because, well, all media companies do that. 
All this may seem like an exercise in the obvious.  My larger point, 
though, is that Austin-style campaign finance regulation—an approach 
that proved workable enough in practice for the sixty-odd years it was in 
place—only worked because it was limited to speech in a particular 
narrow context carrying a sharply constrained set of messages.  Its 
distinction between distorting and informative corporate speech would 
have been incoherent in a broader setting.421 
 
421.  Along similar lines, see Michael McConnell’s argument that the FECA was 
unconstitutional—and Citizens United rightly decided—because the distinction between 
protected corporate media and unprotected non-media was unworkable even within the 
narrow elections context.  See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a 
Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 438 (2013) (stating that FECA could be upheld only if 
First Amendment press protections could be confined to “the journalism profession”—but 
“[t]here is no coherent way to distinguish the institutional press from others who disseminate 
information and opinion to the public through communications media”). 
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Nor would it have made sense to transplant Austin to a broader 
setting in any event.  Recall that corporations’ spending on political 
speech directed to the public is dwarfed by their spending on non-public 
speech directed at government officials (i.e., lobbying).422  The Court has 
given corporate spending on lobbying a warm constitutional embrace.  
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
the Court referred to the legislative lobbying activities of two dozen 
railroads, their trade association, and their public relations firm as just 
an example of “the people . . . freely inform[ing] the government of their 
wishes,” implicating the constitutional right of petition.423  There was no 
suggestion there that corporations were somehow outside the American 
political community—quite the contrary, from the perspective of Justice 
Black’s opinion, railroad corporations were the people.424  Yet any 
serious attempt to address the concerns of Austin in the larger political 
sphere would be better addressed to lobbying than to political 
advertising. 
Indeed, such an attempt would have to take into account corporate 
charity as well.  Consider the fast-food restaurant chain Chick-fil-A.  
The company provides essentially all of the funding of the charitable 
WinShape Foundation, giving it more than $22 million in 2011 alone.425  
WinShape in turn engages in a variety of speech activities, and has 
funded other groups that engage in speech activities (in particular, in 
2011, it passed along nearly $3 million to the Marriage and Family 
Foundation, an entity created to support “public awareness campaigns” 
relating to marriage and sexual morality).426  Any attempt to purge the 
 
422.   See supra pp. 600–03. 
423.   365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961). 
424.   The Court in Noerr rooted its ultimate holding—that legislative lobbying could not 
be the basis for antitrust liability—in statutory construction rather than in the Constitution.  
Id. at 135–45.  However, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 
508 (1972), in which plaintiffs sought antitrust liability for defendant trucking corporations’ 
aggressive institution of administrative and judicial proceedings against them, the Court 
shifted to a constitutional basis.  It held that “groups with common interests,” such as the 
defendants, had First Amendment rights of association and petition, precluding liability so 
long as their litigation was not a “sham.”  Id. at 510–11. 
425.   I am aggregating a $7.7 million dollar contribution from Chick-fil-A and a $14.7 
million dollar contribution from its sister corporation CFA Properties.  See Winshape 
Foundation, Inc., Form 990-PF: Return of Private Foundation, at sched. B pt. I (2011), 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_archive/581/581595471/581595471_201112_990PF.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7A5H-GBRQ].  WinShape was formed in 1982 by Chick-fil-A’s founder 
S. Truett Cathy.   
426.  See id. at pt. 6; Lucas Grindley, A Big Loophole? Chick-fil-A Is Already Raising 
Questionable Money, ADVOCATE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.advocate.com/business/2012/09
/20/chick-fil-raising-money-very-week-anti-marriage-equality-group [https://perma.cc/RC8T-
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public debate of speech funded, directly or indirectly, by for-profit 
corporations would have to sweep very widely indeed.427  Such moves 
would neither be plausible nor consistent with our constitutional 
tradition. 
VII.COMMERCIAL SPEECH REDUX 
We saw in the previous part that—while tension between default and 
alternative viewpoints is inevitable—it’s especially hard for election law 
to incorporate both Austin’s understanding of corporate speech and the 
default position’s acceptance of the huge speech advantages given to 
wealthy individuals.428  Making that work rests on the proposition that 
corporations fall outside the American circle of citizenship, a circle 
containing only human persons.  But that proposition requires difficult 
line drawing and contested assumptions. 
Moreover, drawing the boundaries of Austin is made more 
challenging by the fact that so much of the valuable information and 
viewpoints in our society is made available to the public by 
corporations—and any attendant distortion is so ingrained in the fabric 
of our society that we cannot really address it.  Finally, limitations on 
corporate political speech risk irrelevance given the other multiple 
avenues of corporate influence on society, whether through commercial 
speech, lobbying of legislators and administrators, or contributions to 
other entities engaged in political and speech activity. 
When we turn our attention to commercial speech, on the other 
hand, the alternative position seems to have no such fragility.  In part, 
the alternative position is more secure in this context because 
commercial speech as a class does not seem to have much First 
Amendment value; that’s why the Court did not imagine that it was 
protected at all until the 1970s.429 
Commercial speech addresses such matters as which shampoo to 
buy, not whether to re-elect a political incumbent.  It may well, as 
Justice Blackmun stated, promote the efficient working of economic 
markets—markets work best when consumers have more information 
                                                                                                                                           
9YAP].  The Marriage and Family Foundation, like Winshape, was founded by a member of 
the Cathy family, which owns Chick-fil-A. 
427.   Charitable contributions by for-profit corporations, in addition, can help buy 
political support from nonprofits for the company’s positions.  See, e.g., Eliza Krigman, 
AT&T Gave Cash to Merger Backers, POLITICO (June 10, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/56660.html [https://perma.cc/F4SY-4K3X]. 
428.  See supra Part VI. 
429.   See supra Part II. 
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and advertising can convey that information.430  But how to structure 
markets is a matter for democratic determination; the potential value of 
commercial advertising in helping those markets doesn’t support using 
the First Amendment to override those democratic judgments.431  The 
key First Amendment principle behind a rule disapproving government 
restriction of commercial advertising is our suspicion of selective 
government censorship.  But it’s a contestable empirical question 
whether, in the realm of advertising,432 government power or private 
power poses the greater threat.433  
Line-drawing problems, moreover, are less problematic in the 
commercial speech context than they are in the larger context of all 
corporate speech.  While it may be problematic to say whether a 
particular instance of speech should be classed as “commercial,”434 those 
problems are insignificant compared to the challenge of classifying 
disfavored speech that we encountered in the previous section. 
In the context of corporate speech, finally, we saw a limitation to 
regulatory effectiveness in that a corporation debarred from engaging in 
political speech outside of the elections context could always make its 
points in other ways, including shifting its resources to nonprofit 
organizations.435  In the commercial speech context, by contrast, a 
shampoo company is likely to have little success in shifting resources to 
an appreciative nonprofit so that the latter can engage in speech urging 
the public to buy its benefactor’s shampoo. 
 
430.   Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
763–65 (1976). 
431.   See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
432.   It is relevant here that the informational value of much advertising (especially 
television advertising) is low.  See Avery M. Abernethy & George R. Franke, The 
Information Content of Advertising: A Meta-Analysis, 25 J. ADVERT. 1, 11 (1996).  The 
foundational analysis is Alan Resnik & Bruce L. Stern, An Analysis of Information Content in 
Television Advertising, 41 J. MARKETING 50 (1977). 
433.  The dangers of government power in the misleading-advertising and trademark 
contexts, to be sure, are not nonexistent.  See, e.g., supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text; 
see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).  And there 
have been politically fraught instances where firms have sought to use commercial speech 
regulation to gain an advantage in the marketplace.  See, e.g., supra notes 105–07 and 
accompanying text.  But the alternative position is consistent with the conclusion that 
nonetheless the greater evils are those averted by regulation. 
434.   See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 254 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 
654 (2003). 
435.   See supra p. 623.  In the pre-Citizens United electioneering context, nonprofit 
corporations that had received funds from for-profit corporations were themselves subject to 
FECA electioneering limitations.  See supra note 198.  But such restrictions would not be 
plausible in the extended version of Austin imagined in the previous part of this Article. 
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In short, the alternative position seems pretty robust in the context 
of commercial speech.  But this discussion raises the question whether 
alternative concerns should be dominant—as they are under current 
law—only when commercial speech is said to be “misleading.”  I urged 
earlier that the alternative position is a legitimate countertradition 
within American law and, indeed, a necessary one.436  So we must 
choose where it has sway and where it does not; and when it comes to 
commercial speech, it’s worth examining whether the line the Supreme 
Court has drawn is the right one. 
To think about that, let’s look at the case of Capital Broadcasting 
Co. v. Mitchell.437  That pre-Virginia Board case addressed the 
constitutionality of federal law banning cigarette advertising from radio 
and television.438  The three-judge district court had little difficulty 
upholding the statute, citing the subordinate First Amendment status of 
product advertising,439 and the Supreme Court affirmed.440 
It is impossible to justify that result under current doctrine.  In 
Virginia Board, the Court distinguished Capital Broadcasting in a 
footnote, waving its hands at “the special problems of the electronic 
broadcast media.”441  That was all very well for 1972, when we treated 
broadcasters as subject to entirely separate First Amendment rules, but 
it does not hold up today. 
In 1972, one could argue that a broadcaster’s carriage of cigarette 
advertising was sanctionable because it disserved the Communications 
Act’s “public interest” standard.442  Indeed, one could plausibly argue 
then that the Communications Act gave the government wide leeway to 
ban all sorts of content-defined categories of speech from the airways.443  
 
436.   See supra Part V. 
437.   333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d mem. sub nom., Capital Broad. Co. v. Acting 
Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
438.   Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 584. 
439.   Id. at 583. 
440.   Capital Broad., 405 U.S. 1000. 
441.   Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
773 (1976). 
442.   47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (c) (2012). 
443.   See Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
221, 250–57 (1996); cf. Monroe Commc’ns Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(stating that “obscene broadcasts . . . bear on the public interest” and, therefore, FCC license 
renewal proceeding must take up allegations that the licensee had aired obscene movies as 
scrambled subscription programming); Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603–05 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (stating that a broadcaster’s playing songs said to promote illegal drug use may be 
inconsistent with its public interest obligations), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).  But see, 
e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 177–
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But the Supreme Court never endorsed such an approach, and would 
not do so today.  To be sure, the Court has applied an intermediate-
scrutiny standard to some content-based restrictions of broadcast 
speech, upholding them if they are adequately well tailored to 
promoting “the public’s ‘paramount right’ to be fully and broadly 
informed on matters of public importance” in the broadcast context.444  
But it has done so only in limited contexts pertaining to structural 
considerations such as the fairness doctrine or broadcast diversity—not 
as a means of suppressing disfavored views.445  When the Court post-
Virginia Board considered cases presenting restrictions on commercial 
speech in the broadcast medium, it did not suggest that the standard of 
scrutiny in these cases was any lower than in the nonbroadcast 
context.446 
And without a special rule for broadcasting, the Capital 
Broadcasting result is badly out of sync with modern law.  In Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court considered a Massachusetts law 
banning any smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising within 1,000 feet of a 
playground.447  It recognized that the restriction would legitimately and 
directly further the state’s goal of discouraging use of those products by 
minors but nonetheless found it too sweeping, especially given that 
“tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying 
truthful information about their products to adults, and adults have a 
corresponding interest in receiving truthful information about tobacco 
products.”448  Given that result, it is hard to imagine how the federal 
broadcast ban—which contains no exceptions, say, for late-night hours 
when children are likely to be in bed—could survive a challenge.449  
                                                                                                                                           
82 (1987) (excoriating the Yale Broadcasting decision). 
444.   FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 398–99 (1984). 
445.   See Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), overruled by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  The Ninth Circuit recently applied this 
intermediate standard in upholding the statutory plan setting aside broadcast frequencies for 
“noncommercial educational” licensees who promise to run educational programming and 
are forbidden to accept paid advertisements.  Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 
F.3d 1192, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014). 
446.   See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); 
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
447.   533 U.S. 525, 535 (2001).  The Massachusetts law also restricted advertising of 
cigarettes; the Court found those provisions to be preempted by federal law.  Id. at 570–71. 
448.   Id. at 564. 
449.   Cf. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(striking down a 24-hour-a-day ban on broadcast indecency on the ground that it was not well 
tailored to the goal of protecting children), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914 (1992). 
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Certainly the Court in Lorillard appeared to see no legitimate state 
interest in restricting cigarette advertising to adults.450 
But should we therefore conclude that Capital Broadcasting was 
wrongly decided?  I find myself unable to see much good in a body of 
First Amendment law that would foreclose the right of the people, 
through their democratic representatives, to decide that they do not 
want broadcast advertising of cigarettes.451  The evidence of a link 
between advertising and tobacco use is strong,452 and the cost in dollars 
and lives is tremendous.  From the standpoint of Justice Blackmun’s 
concern for efficient working of the economic marketplace,453 the 
informational value of cigarette advertising on television is trivial.  Try 
as I might, I find it hard to imagine disqualifying First Amendment 
damage being done there.  (Indeed, from the perspective of the 
alternative position, we might note the historic success of the tobacco 
industry in suppressing editorial discussion of the health risks of 
smoking in magazines dependent on cigarette advertising and ask about 
the First Amendment damage thus done by allowing cigarette 
advertising.454) 
Or consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.455  This was a pre-Virginia 
Board case upholding a rule forbidding a newspaper from including 
columns labeled “Jobs-Male Interest” and “Jobs-Female Interest” in its 
help wanted ads.456  The Court later characterized Pittsburgh Press as 
unproblematic from a First Amendment standpoint because “the 
 
450.   See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Worcester, 851 F. Supp. 2d 311, 
319 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding that Sorrell forecloses such a justification). 
451.   The story behind this particular statutory provision is complicated.  Prior to the 
statute’s enactment, the FCC had interpreted the fairness doctrine to require broadcasters 
carrying cigarette advertising to provide a significant amount of broadcast time to anti-
smoking public service announcements.  See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).  “[T]he individual tobacco companies could not stop 
advertising for fear of losing their competitive position; yet for every dollar they spent to 
advance their product, they forced the airing of more anti-smoking advertisements and hence 
lost more customers.”  Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D.D.C. 1971) 
(Skelly Wright, J., dissenting), aff’d mem., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).  The tobacco industry 
supported the statutory advertising ban to address that dilemma.  Id. at 588–89.  Today, of 
course, with the fairness doctrine long since repealed and generally understood to be 
unconstitutional, that dilemma would not exist. 
452.  See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 557–61. 
453.   See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 762–63 (1976). 
454.   See generally Lowenstein, supra note 86. 
455.   413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
456.   Id. at 379. 
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transactions proposed in the forbidden advertisements [were] 
themselves illegal.”457  It relied on the fact that a city ordinance forbade 
gender discrimination in hiring.458 
But it’s trickier than that.  The newspaper pages stated that 
employers would consider both men and women for any job except as 
explicitly noted in a specific advertisement and warned that gender 
discrimination in employment was illegal.459  The newspaper took the 
apparently sincere position that it was listing the jobs separately for the 
convenience of its readers, so that male readers would not have to waste 
their time wading through ads for girly jobs that would only interest 
women and female readers would not waste their own time looking at 
ads for butch boyish jobs that could not possibly interest them.460  To 
that end, even if an employer did not specify in which column its ad 
should be run, the newspaper would go back and ask, so as to know 
where to file it.461 
It seems plain, especially from the perspective of forty years later, 
that the newspaper’s attitude was retrograde, pernicious, and actively 
harmful.  It is hard to argue that in this commercial-speech context a 
government rule that want ad columns should not be gender identified 
surpassed First Amendment bounds.  But the justification that the 
columns amounted to advertisement of illegal transactions—as if the 
columns were labeled “Narcotics for Sale”—does not quite do it.  The 
two cases are not parallel. It would be illegal for the company that 
placed such an ad to sell narcotics, but it was not illegal for an employer 
to hire a person responding to one of its employment ads. 
Rather, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that—as in Capital 
Broadcasting—the Court was applying a standard of scrutiny for state 
regulation of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech that was more 
forgiving than ordinary First Amendment doctrine calls for.  Further, I 
would argue, its decision to do so was appropriate.  The Justices 
validated that approach a few years later in Central Hudson, explaining 
that content-based regulation of even truthful, nonmisleading 
advertising was fine so long as it directly and parsimoniously advanced 
some “substantial” government interest.462 
 
457.   Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772. 
458.   See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388–89. 
459.   Id. at 381 n.7. 
460.  Id. 
461.   Id. at 380 n.5. 
462.   See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 568–69 
(1980). 
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In the Sorrell case, the Court discarded the Central Hudson rule, 
denying the existence of any more forgiving standard for the regulation 
of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.463  But Sorrell’s context 
provides no compelling support for that change. And absent such 
support, it’s unclear why we would want the First Amendment to be a 
guarantor of pharmaceutical companies’ ability to tailor sales pitches 
and gift inducements individually for each doctor in a state so that the 
companies can more successfully use targeted techniques in aid of 
prodding the doctors to overprescribe proprietary drugs at the expense 
of generics. 
Once we recognize the interplay between classic First Amendment 
thinking and the alternative perspective in the law of commercial 
speech, rather, we should recognize that we have a choice between 
them.  I would argue that the more regulation-friendly rule of Central 
Hudson found a better balance than the Court found in Sorrell.  In 
recent years, the Court has moved away from the alternative position in 
both corporate speech and commercial speech law.  That has achieved 
some ideological consistency.  But it may not have made us better off. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s divided commercial speech jurisprudence 
combines comfort with regulation of misleading commercial speech, 
with a growing hostility to content regulation of commercial advertising 
on any ground other than that it is false and misleading, in a way that 
seems hard to justify.  We can understand that divide better when we 
look at the law made by the Court regarding speech by corporations 
generally.  Those cases are driven by a parallel set of considerations and 
display a parallel internal contradiction.  In the corporate speech 
context, the Supreme Court has recently moved decisively to uphold 
traditional free speech philosophy at the expense of the alternative, 
more pro-regulatory, worldview.  In the commercial speech context, 
there is nonetheless a good argument for resting the law on an 
alternative set of foundations—recognizing the ubiquity of distortion 
and nonrational thinking, leaving room for paternalism, and relying on 
fact-specific determinations—notwithstanding that those thoughts are 
disfavored in ordinary First Amendment philosophy. 
 
463.   Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671–72 (2011). 
